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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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on 7 December 1942, when the Federal Council established maximum prices<br />

for gold coins and bars, thus restricting the opportunities for the banks to profit<br />

from the sharp rise in the price of gold. In addition, SNB permission was henceforth<br />

required for the import or export of gold. Credit Suisse (<strong>Schweiz</strong>erische<br />

Kreditanstalt, SKA) was given a licence to import small amounts of gold;<br />

however, in September 1943 it was refused permission to accept the delivery of<br />

gold from the suspect operations of Deutsche Bank’s Istanbul branch. 3<br />

The largest transactions in the context of the «escudo business» (Escudo-<br />

Geschäft) took place up until the summer of 1942. These transactions enabled<br />

the Reichsbank to sell gold to the SNB for francs or Portuguese escudos in order<br />

to pay for strategically important raw materials and other key imports for the<br />

German war economy. The Banco de Portugal then bought gold from the SNB<br />

with the francs accumulated in its foreign currency reserves. Such transactions<br />

with the Reichsbank reached their peak in the winter of 1941/42. From the<br />

summer of 1942, Germany began to sell gold directly to Portugal via the<br />

deposit account in Bern, and the escudo deals became less significant for the<br />

Swiss financial centre. Nonetheless, the associated gold shipments by the<br />

Reichsbank continued to be channelled through Switzerland.<br />

The substantial purchases from Germany, including coins (mostly from the<br />

Latin Monetary Union which included Belgium, France, and Italy as well as<br />

Switzerland) continued for some time. It was later revealed that all these coins<br />

had come from the holdings of the Belgian Central Bank. At the same time, the<br />

SNB sold a large quantity of gold coins on the market, including those acquired<br />

from the Reichsbank. These transactions were an attractive source of revenue:<br />

the SNB earned 12.3 million francs from the purchase and sale of foreignminted<br />

gold coins during the war. A significant proportion of these coins may<br />

eventually have been exported by private individuals, especially to France,<br />

where they are likely to have sustained an active underground or black market<br />

economy. The following graph illustrates the gold purchased by the SNB from<br />

the Reichsbank (per quarter).<br />

In addition to these purchases, consignments from the Reichsbank to the SNB<br />

amounted to around 500 million francs. This gold went to the depositories<br />

maintained in Bern by other monetary institutes or by the Reichsbank itself.<br />

Switzerland thus became the centre of complex gold transactions, for in<br />

addition to the Reichsbank and the Bank for International Settlements, BIS<br />

(Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich, BIZ), more than a dozen other<br />

central banks availed themselves of the SNB’s services. The gold sales by the<br />

Reichsbank to Switzerland began to assume unprecedented dimensions in the<br />

last quarter of 1941 and remained at a high level throughout 1942 and 1943.<br />

It was only in the second quarter of 1944 that the volume of these transactions<br />

240

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