22.01.2013 Views

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

e excessive investment, but the Mannheim subsidiary went ahead anyway. To<br />

many people such cautiousness seemed misplaced after the Blitzkrieg in 1940.<br />

On the assumption that the German army’s victories would lead to a new order<br />

in the economy of continental Europe, the conclusion could be drawn that it<br />

was important to ensure a good market position. With this aim in mind, several<br />

Swiss companies more or less left it up to their German subsidiaries in annexed<br />

(Austria, Bohemia and Moravia, and the Alsace) or occupied countries, to<br />

integrate into the German market and comply with its requirements. These<br />

manoeuvres even led to Brown Boveri in Baden losing part of its own market<br />

share to its subsidiary in Mannheim. German expansion also meant the opportunity<br />

of constructing production units in new territories, taking advantage of<br />

local labour and other resources. Accordingly, Nestlé set up a company in<br />

Prague in 1940, of which 93% of the share capital was held by its subsidiary<br />

Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft Nestlé (DAN), and built a factory in the «protectorate».<br />

It was deemed important not to neglect any chance of expansion when<br />

the occasion arose and the funds necessary were available on the spot.<br />

Things soon began to change, however. The attacks on the Soviet Union in June<br />

1941 and the US entering the war in December of the same year implied that<br />

the war would last longer than originally thought. At the beginning of 1943,<br />

it looked as if the outcome would not be in favour of the Axis powers. From then<br />

on the Swiss firms were faced with a dilemma. Apart from Sulzer, none seemed<br />

to have considered withdrawing from Germany, which would have meant losing<br />

absolutely everything they had invested there. The new situation put an end to<br />

expansion plans however. Production plants were at risk either by the Allies<br />

taking over the territory they were located in, or by destruction in bombing<br />

raids. Serious bomb damage was suffered by Brown Boveri in Mannheim, but<br />

by few other Swiss subsidiaries. Most of them were located in Baden, away from<br />

the main urban centres and industrial areas and were therefore not targeted by<br />

Allied air raids. Orders in connection with the war effort poured in and, since<br />

demand exceeded offer, there was no competition. As long as it was supplied<br />

with what it desired, the state asked no questions. Speer, who was now responsible<br />

for the war effort, did reorganise planning, but accorded companies more<br />

confidence and allowed them more independence. Profits rose. On the other<br />

hand, the parent companies in Switzerland foresaw that they risked upsetting<br />

the Allies and being blacklisted, which would mean being forbidden to carry<br />

on any manufacturing and commercial activities within the Allied countries.<br />

Paradoxically, the British blacklisting system was stricter with regard to<br />

companies which exported from Switzerland than with those that manufactured<br />

in Germany, as can be seen in the case of Sulzer. The parent companies protected<br />

their own interests by giving the impression that their subsidiaries operated<br />

301

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!