61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

possible espionage activity, and the increased sense of a national and even
«racial» conflict contributed to the fact that the subsidiaries emphasised their
«German-ness» as much as possible. Another aspect of this was the preference
for employing members of the National Socialist Party, as it could be assumed
that they would offer the Swiss company and its interests a certain degree of
protection. To demonstrate national reliability, it was necessary to play down
the links between Swiss head offices and their German subsidiaries; correspondence
was reduced and more importance accorded to personal contacts. In some
cases this took place on a close and regular basis.
The cases investigated by the ICE show that the majority of Swiss companies
with strong links to Germany adapted to the situation. This was true as regards
both their activities in Germany and the decisions taken at their head office.
That there was some leeway, and that this could be used with impunity – at least
in some documented circumstances – is shown in several exceptions to the rule.
The interests of the Swiss companies in Germany naturally coinciding with
German interests, a certain degree of latitude on the part of the subsidiary
company must have existed, but would never seem to have been exploited.
The Swiss authorities’ interest in the effect of Swiss business activity on foreign
policy and security, as well as on its consequences for Swiss manufacturing activities
and for internal social relations, is obvious. Thus, as late as March 1944, a
report on job-creation argued that Switzerland’s export production should be
increased «far above its pre-war status» with a view to creating new jobs. It is
worth noting the date of this report, as it raises the question whether Swiss
companies broke off their close ties with the German business community once
it dawned upon them that Germany would lose the war. No precise date can be
given for this realisation; not least because different players interpreted the
military situation in different ways.
Switzerland’s exports to Germany diminished considerably in the course of
1943. In the same year the Swiss spokesmen at the economic negotiations with
the Reich adopted a more severe tone. As of April 1944, the Swiss National
Bank refused to accept further deliveries of gold coins from the Reich. In
October 1944, the government prohibited the export of arms and ammunition.
In January 1945, it restricted the delivery of German coal to Italy. As the defeat
of the Reich became apparent and its liquidity ever more doubtful, Swiss
creditors tried desperately, in highly dubious negotiations, to recover
outstanding claims. It is well known that, in trying to secure German gold
deliveries of the final days of the war, Hans Koenig of the Rentenanstalt wished
to safeguard the claims of a host of Swiss insurance companies, and this despite
the fact that it had been known for a long time that Reichsbank gold represented
looted assets, that the Allies had issued a warning that transactions of
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