61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

Switzerland was under military threat and to what extent has been disputed for
some years. 94 Contrary to the predominant view at the time, today’s descriptions
of military history stress that the Wehrmacht was developing plans of attack on
Switzerland after their victory over France which, however, never came to
fruition. 95 On the other hand, the fear of attack was great in May 1940 and
March 1943, when there was little threat from external military powers. 96 The
events in Norway produced a particularly vivid impression, one which intensified
in April/May 1940 and continued to grow thereafter, that Switzerland
could be under threat behind the front lines from a combination of parachute
troops and members of a «Fifth Column» («Fünfte Kolonne»). 97 The Federal
Council’s Decree of 7 May 1940 to create hundreds of local defence outposts
containing men who had not yet been mobilised should be seen in this context.
In retrospect, however, the summer of 1940 was nevertheless characterised by a
surprising lack of fear (of a military invasion rather than that of the general
supremacy of Germany). Heinrich Homberger, director of Vorort felt that the
existence of Switzerland was more under threat economically than it was from
military powers in November 1940. In March 1941, he declared: «Fortunately
we have [...] a proven production capability and significant financial capacity.
Germany is only interested in Switzerland as a free and willing partner.» 98 As
early as June 1940, investors in the Swiss financial market considered
Switzerland to be a safer market than in the previous months. 99 This should not,
however, obscure the fact that morale in the army was extremely low in these
critical months. A report dated 13 August 1940 showed that the morale of the
troops was low and that there were widespread defeatist attitudes: 75% of the
troops no longer believed that the command to fight would be given in the
event of attack. 100 Wehrmacht planners also assumed, in a study of October 1940,
that there would have been a rapid surrender in the event of an attack – an
assumption which may well have proved to be false. 101
Overall, a feeling of uncertainty and fear had prevailed since the end of the
1930s. Switzerland was, however, primarily caught up in internal problems.
Although events on the international scene left some mark on the national
psyche, the «domestic» situation was at the forefront of most people’s minds.
National ecconomic supply and the securing of food supply
Apart from notoriously pro-German groups or those dazzled by the power of the
Nazi regime, it was clear to most contemporaries that sooner or later Hitler
would make Switzerland into a vassal state or even divide it up. 102 The meaning
of «national defence» («Landesverteidigung») became important in these circumstances
and was extended to include all social dimensions. The security and
independence of the country was to be achieved with a combined military,
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