61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

Nazis and used them in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. In a few cases
where the false names used came to be known, the identities of prominent Nazi
perpetrators were revealed. On the other hand, an unknown number escaped
notice. Mengele repeatedly visited Switzerland and was not arrested even when
the German authorities provided the appropriate tips.
Figures and estimates
The results presented appear somewhat more down-to-earth than much of the
speculation either then or now. It was not possible to identify massive quantities
of displaced assets in camouflage operations that had never been discovered, nor
can Switzerland be described as a hiding place or staging post for countless
escaping Nazis. Nevertheless, the findings are not insignificant – if they had
been, the questions and investigations of the immediate post-war period would
not have met with such heavy resistance. Resistance was also great where the
transactions in danger of being inventoried were comparatively modest, since
the investigations impinged on the privileges of powerful interest groups. Thus
the findings of that time – to the extent that the public was even informed about
them – were soon placed under lock and key.
As to our queries on the scope of the phenomena described, it is possible to state
the following:
The number of economic camouflage operations could be defined very precisely
if more of the quarterly statistical reports prepared by the German Foreign
Exchange Control Offices (Devisenstellen) at the time were available. However,
on the basis of fragmentary information, we can estimate that during the first
phase of the war a total of over 500, but certainly less than a thousand, such
arrangements came into being. It is not possible to determine exactly how these
were distributed among the neutral countries. However, the number of German
camouflage operations in Switzerland alone could be estimated at several
hundred. This is also confirmed by the large number of entries in the Allies’
blacklists. 41
As regards German assets in Switzerland, the Swiss Clearing Office recorded
something in excess of a billion francs in May 1946. This figure is clearly too low.
After various additions, some of which are based on estimates, we arrive at almost
twice the figure; in other words, more than two billion francs. By way of
comparison Switzerland’s net national product in 1945 was 13.8 billion francs. 42
It is not possible to determine the exact number of Nazis who took refuge in
Switzerland at the end of the war, or who travelled through Switzerland to other
countries in order to avoid criminal proceedings instituted by the Allies. We
must content ourselves with stating that there were such cases, and that they
stand in stark contrast to the way the nation portrayed itself at the end of the war.
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