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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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the export of foreign currency and to prevent that through the paying of<br />

ransoms – also called the «smuggling of emigrants» – additional refugees<br />

might enter the country. Both the cantonal and Federal authorities investigated<br />

those they suspected of being involved. Swiss foreign policy and refugee policy<br />

dealt only indirectly with the German authorities’ ransom demands. As a<br />

protecting power for Germany, Great Britain and the United States,<br />

Switzerland negotiated between the warring parties and organised the exchange<br />

of civilian prisoners. This involved citizens of the Allied countries who were in<br />

German controlled territories as well as inhabitants of the British mandated<br />

territory of Palestine, who were exchanged for German citizens interned by the<br />

Allies. In many cases the people exchanged were Jews who had been detained<br />

in the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and who had earlier been forced by<br />

the Germans to hand over foreign currency. There was therefore a close link<br />

between the ransom demands and the inclusion of Dutch Jews in the exchange<br />

of civilian prisoners between the Germans and the Allies.<br />

The ICE examined 400 individual cases of extortion in the Netherlands which<br />

involved a total of at least 35 million francs in demands. Half of the cases<br />

revealed a connection to Switzerland, in that either Swiss people acted as<br />

middlemen or that the Swiss authorities or banks were involved. In about 40<br />

cases negotiations proved successful insofar as the victims in question – at least<br />

154 people – escaped their persecutors by paying the ransom. By the middle of<br />

1943, some 20 people had thus entered Switzerland. In 1945 about the same<br />

number of people, who had been deported to either Bergen-Belsen or Theresienstadt,<br />

reached Switzerland as a result of exchanges or ransom negotiations.<br />

The fact that a larger number of Jews did not escape was due first and foremost<br />

to the behaviour of the Nazi authorities, who gave priority to exterminating<br />

Jews rather than «selling» them.<br />

While the ransom operations mentioned here concerned individual cases, most<br />

of which were unsuccessful, two larger groups were bought free towards the end<br />

of the war and stayed in Switzerland temporarily. The first ransom campaign<br />

concerned around 1,700 Hungarian Jews who were first transferred to Bergen-<br />

Belsen and then allowed to enter Switzerland in August and December 1944.<br />

The negotiations were carried out by Saly Mayer and Ross McClelland on the<br />

one side, and SS Obersturmbannführer Kurt Becher and the hostage Reszoe<br />

Kasztner, who represented the Hungarian Jewish community, on the other.<br />

Following the second campaign around 1,200 German, Dutch and Czechoslovakian<br />

Jews were allowed to leave Theresienstadt for Switzerland in February<br />

1945. This deal was negotiated by ex-Federal Councillor Jean-Marie Musy,<br />

relatives and friends of the orthodox Jewish Sternbuch family and, in part, SS<br />

Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler. 162 There were certain parallels between the two<br />

162

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