61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

clever policy managed not to be drawn into the war of 1939 to 1945. Switzerland
was not occupied and succeeded in preserving its institutional independence as
a constitutional, democratic and federal state in the midst of the Nazi sphere of
influence. It remained an «observer» 1 – as Raul Hilberg stated – in the «eye of
the hurricane», spared the destruction of property, as well as moral devastation.
Completely encircled by the Axis powers between summer 1940 and autumn
1944, it was for years threatened by an aggressively expanding Nazi Germany
characterised by a racial ideology and a desire to gain «living space». The country
therefore settled down into a «fortress mentality» («Reduitstellung») 2 to face an
uncertain future. Swiss Legation Counsellor Robert Kohli, who was a leading
figure in Swiss trade negotiations with Germany, said on 13 October 1943 when
preparing an economic delegation about to depart for London: «The entire policy
[...] will consist of playing for time». 3 A few days before the war ended, on 4 May
1945, Heinrich Homberger, who along with Kohli was on the delegation for
trade negotiations, said in an address to the Swiss Chamber of Commerce: «It is
characteristic of neutrality policy that we adapt ourselves to the state of affairs,
but this is subject to the proviso that we allow the situation develop.» 4 This
«temporising tactic» was as widespread in the Swiss government as it was among
the population, thereby giving free rein to the strong Swiss tendency to
disengage themselves as a «special case» («Sonderfall») from the overall historical
context, to maintain political self-sufficiency, and withdraw to the spectator’s
bench of world history or – as Pierre Béguin put it approvingly in 1951 – to the
«balcony overlooking Europe» («balcon sur l’Europe»). 5
In another respect, however, Switzerland was anything but an observer. The
standard of living of its population was heavily dependent on close economic
ties with Europe and overseas, and in particular of course with neighbouring
countries. After 1940, trade with Germany thus intensified considerably.
Switzerland had a stable, convertible currency that was particularly attractive
to a Third Reich which suffered from a perennial shortage of foreign currency.
It had efficient road and rail links across the Alps to offer, which represented the
shortest route between the two Axis powers, Germany and Italy. In addition,
the German-speaking part of Switzerland had close intellectual and cultural
links with Germany; even when they clearly distanced themselves from each
other after 1933 and the gulf widened still further with the outbreak of war, the
personal network did not break up completely – nor did the network that linked
French-speaking Switzerland with France. Switzerland’s self-image could never
eliminate these many and varied trade relationships and common interests
completely. For example, in spring 1946, Ernst Speiser, director of Brown
Boveri & Co. (BBC) in Baden, head of the important Federal War Industry and
Labour Office (Kriegs-Industrie- und Arbeits-Amt) since 1941 and also a Radical
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