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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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sation in full knowledge of the wrong that had been done. In the sources which<br />

document the reasoning of Swiss firms with regard to the acquisition of Jewish<br />

property there is hardly any evidence of ethical considerations. This applies even<br />

to Hoffmann-La Roche, a firm which refused five different offers of take-overs<br />

between 1933 and 1938 and withdrew from the purchase of a building in 1940<br />

after the original owner lodged an objection: only economic, political and legal<br />

considerations are documented. 57 In contrast to the issue of personnel policy in<br />

the subsidiaries, there are very few indications that anti-Semitism played a role<br />

in the acquisition of Jewish property. The overriding element was commercial<br />

advantage, the «extremely favourable» conditions which attracted many firms,<br />

as for example the arms manufacturer Emil Bührle. 58 In summer 1941 the<br />

Union Bank of Switzerland (<strong>Schweiz</strong>erische Bankgesellschaft, SBG), acting on<br />

behalf of Wilhelm von Gutmann, an Austrian banker who lived in Chur<br />

(Switzerland), offered Bührle von Gutmann’s shares in the Czech firm<br />

Witkowitz Bergbau- und Eisenhüttengewerkschaft. The bank was acting on the<br />

assumption that, from the point of view of setting a price, «a Swiss purchaser<br />

should not be in a worse position than a German purchaser and that the basic<br />

price as indicated corresponds roughly to present-day German calculations». 59<br />

The value of the Witkowitz business was at the time between 75 and<br />

80 million US dollars; the purchase price was set at 20 million US dollars.<br />

Shortly afterwards the managing director, Alfred Schaefer, approached Bührle<br />

again on behalf of the Union Bank and told him that the vendors were reckoning<br />

on a valuation at 30 million US dollars, but that he thought that this could be<br />

brought down to 25 million US dollars. In October 1941, Bührle replied that<br />

«if one knows what the Witkowitz Co. represents, and I have a pretty good idea<br />

from visiting the plant myself, one can only say that this is a real bargain».<br />

Bührle did not in fact go ahead with the transaction, mainly since, although the<br />

amount asked was low compared with the real value of the business, in absolute<br />

terms it was a high price; «the enormous risk involved in this investment has<br />

nothing to do with the company itself but is purely a question of current<br />

politics». 60<br />

Swiss debtors of Jewish business partners within Nazi-controlled territory<br />

Some Jewish business partners within Nazi-controlled territory possessed bank<br />

assets in Switzerland or could call in debts arising from deliveries to Swiss firms.<br />

When so-called provisional administrators were appointed to run their<br />

companies the question arose as to whether the claims made by the former<br />

owners or those of the provisional administrators were valid.<br />

With regard to the liquidation of bank assets, the Swiss banks agreed in May<br />

1938, after the «Anschluss», on a common future strategy. Some of the banks<br />

337

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