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Australian Politics and Policy - Senior, 2019a

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<strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Politics</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Policy</strong><br />

identity, marking one as belonging to a group or st<strong>and</strong>ing for a cause. This, in<br />

turn, can bring status, enjoyment <strong>and</strong> social capital.<br />

• Purposive benefits: relatetothegroup’spurpose,suchastochangeapolicy,<br />

promote an idea, or pursue a particular action. 23 These purposive benefits are<br />

also termed ‘expressive’ benefits, as people join to voice their values <strong>and</strong> ideals. 24<br />

Clark <strong>and</strong> Wilson argued that one or more of these benefits must be provided to<br />

members to either entice them to join or to remain part of the organisation. A<br />

pressure group’s continued existence depends upon members sharing in the group<br />

benefits, <strong>and</strong> group organisers extracting advantage from those members. 25<br />

Collective action <strong>and</strong> free riders<br />

This leads to debates about how public-spirited pressure groups <strong>and</strong> movements<br />

are. Mancur Olson argued that collective action was primarily motivated by desire<br />

for individual benefit, but a benefit not available to a person acting alone. This<br />

‘rational choice’ approach focuses on the cost–benefit calculation of members in<br />

joining groups <strong>and</strong> movements. In this model, groups form because some<br />

individuals perceive opportunities to benefit, possibly at the expense of others. 26<br />

Thus, some pressure groups have been seen to profit at a higher expense, such as<br />

seeking a subsidy for a small group paid for by general taxation.<br />

This approach also explains paradoxes in group formation: if groups produce<br />

public benefits that all can access, what is the incentive of participation for the<br />

individual? If groups become too large, some may benefit without paying the costs<br />

of the group. This problem of ‘free riding’ can be seen in the way some groups<br />

attempt to restrict the benefits of their collective action to their membership, such<br />

as when unions historically enforced ‘no ticket no start’ requirements that<br />

workplaces must employ union members.<br />

Justice <strong>and</strong> altruism<br />

Other scholars observe that rational choice fails to explain participation, or<br />

recognise the role of ethics, justice <strong>and</strong> morality in tempering the ‘selfish’<br />

motivations of individuals <strong>and</strong> pressure groups. 27 The field of behavioural<br />

economics recognises that human decisions are not always based on perfect<br />

rationality, <strong>and</strong> uses insights from psychology to explore various motivations for<br />

behaviour in exchange transactions. 28 People judge intuitively, automatically <strong>and</strong><br />

emotionally, in line with their experience, <strong>and</strong> emotions are important aspects of<br />

23 Clark <strong>and</strong> Wilson 1961, 134–5.<br />

24 Salisbury 1969, 16.<br />

25 Salisbury 1969.<br />

26 Marsh 1995, 50; Matthews 1980, 455; Olson 2002 [1965].<br />

27 Cigler 1990; Flam <strong>and</strong> King 2005; Sen 1977.<br />

28 Thaler <strong>and</strong> Sunstein 2008.<br />

434

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