Australian Politics and Policy - Senior, 2019a

Australian Politics and Policy
On face value, we might think that prime ministers only want the best
performers as ministers. Yet, strategically, prime ministers need a mix of skills
within Cabinet – some ministers to drive policy agendas, others who can act
assteadyhands.Thentherearethosewhocannotbeignoredbecauseoftheir
ambitionorotherpartyreasons,eveniftheylacktheskillsthatmakestrong
ministers. Some ministers may be appointed solely as a reward, to secure loyalty or
to keep enemies under close observation.
Managing the executive
A minister is a partisan and temporary head of department. Ministers only serve
as long as the prime minister retains their services and their government survives.
By contrast, the bureaucracy is the non-partisan and permanent institution that’s
purpose is to serve the government by offering advice and transforming executive
will into reality.
In short, ministers – the principal actors – delegate their authority to their bureaucracies
– their agents. But, in practice, it is not that simple. The principal–agent
problem between ministers (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) is one of information
asymmetry. Even though ministers are in charge, the bureaucrats that
serve them are often more expert and more experienced; through this information
asymmetry, bureaucrats can have a greater influence on the eventual outcome. 17
One reason for this is that opposition is only partial preparation for government,
offering no experience in running a large organisation like a government
department. In cases where information asymmetry is large and a minister is
uncritical, that minister may even be considered ‘captured’ by the bureaucracy.
Politically appointed staff
In Australia, the 1970s saw growing complaints by both major parties that the
bureaucracy was insufficiently ‘responsive’ to the (partisan) needs of ministers.
Similar complaints were repeated in other countries. Politicians identified two
problems. First, governments felt that an overly powerful bureaucracy diluted
ministers’ power to implement the political mandate they had secured at the
election. Ministers were outnumbered in ministerial offices and lacked their own
(partisan) sources of advice. Second, a non-partisan bureaucracy was poorly
equipped to assist ministers with the political aspects of their job, such as advocating
and overseeing the implementation of ideologically compatible policies. 18
In 1972, Labor returned to power and appointed large numbers of political staff
to support its ministers due to its long-running distrust of a bureaucracy that had
17 The comedy classic Yes, Minister is replete with amusing examples of this problem.
18 Taflaga 2017.
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