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Australian Politics and Policy - Senior, 2019a

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<strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Politics</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Policy</strong><br />

In fact, some advocacy groups have received government funding to represent<br />

the interests of those unable to represent themselves politically. Funding was mainly<br />

provided to organisations who would advocate for citizens without sufficient skills,<br />

power, resources or funds to advocate for themselves or participate in public debate.<br />

This offered a way to connect unrepresented people to government through peak<br />

bodies, helping to address inequalities in society.<br />

A number of organisations, including the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL),<br />

had funding withdrawn in the late 1990s, prompting speculation about alternatives<br />

for the representation of such groups. 71 Some groups, particularly organisations<br />

providing welfare support, appear to have replaced some of this funding through<br />

government service delivery contracts. These contracts included provisions to<br />

refrain from commenting on policy, so receiving the funding limited their capacity<br />

to comment on policy matters <strong>and</strong> undermined their ability to participate in robust<br />

political <strong>and</strong> policy debate.<br />

Are they ‘good’ for democracy?<br />

Within the framework of political economy <strong>and</strong> public choice theory, organised<br />

interests can be seen as a risk to good governance. Interest groups operate<br />

ultimately from the same selfish motive: to benefit themselves, even to the exclusion<br />

of others. They behave to maximise their economic, societal <strong>and</strong> legal or regulatory<br />

conditions as they pursue their objectives in the political sphere. Political <strong>and</strong><br />

policy decisions may be attributed to the expedience <strong>and</strong> motivations of politicians<br />

<strong>and</strong> political parties, such as electoral advantage, rather than policy best practice. 72<br />

Ultimately, while governments determine which interests to indulge, interest<br />

group behaviour cannot be separated ‘from the surrounding institutional <strong>and</strong><br />

cultural framework’. 73 In other words, governments cannot always be relied upon<br />

to ensure a balance of optimal outcomes for all interests. 74 In this critique, interest<br />

groups potentially undermine governance <strong>and</strong> the economy.<br />

Democratic participation<br />

More positively, Beer identified pressure group types which governments can harness<br />

to achieve superior policy outcomes. In this way, pressure groups are functional:<br />

they support, rather than destabilise, governance <strong>and</strong> democracy (although Beer<br />

cautioned that special interests had the potential to ‘impair’ a political system’s<br />

action for the long-term interests of its citizenry). 75 Beer’s more optimistic approach<br />

71 Sawer, Abjorensen <strong>and</strong> Larkin 2009, 233.<br />

72 Frey 1980, 66; Self 1993, 45.<br />

73 Marsh 1995.<br />

74 DeAngelis <strong>and</strong> Parkin 1986, 316; Marsh 1995.<br />

75 Beer 1982, 4.<br />

442

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