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Kenney_and_Clausen B.M.W.(eds.) - Get a Free Blog

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THE POEMS OF EXILE<br />

distinction is carefully observed by the punctilious Horace {Odes 3.5.1—4,<br />

Episu 2.1.15). In ascribing actual divinity to Augustus, as he had already done<br />

more than once in the Fasti, Ovid was no doubt voicing a common sentiment.<br />

In the Tristia, however, the reiteration of the idea, given the writer's situation,<br />

was bound to be tinged with bitterness, more especially when it is remembered<br />

how often in the Metamorphoses divine anger is the prelude to an act of cruelty<br />

or injustice. This repeated equation of Augustus with the traditional Jupiter<br />

<strong>and</strong> of his power with the thunderbolt is more critical than complimentary.<br />

Ovid's reflections on the character of 'divine' justice are indeed not always<br />

merely implicit: in his apologia he observes that the gods punish mistakes just<br />

as savagely as crimes:<br />

scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est,<br />

nee ueniam laeso nutnine casus habet. (Trist. 2.107—8)<br />

Apparently when one is dealing with the gods even ill-luck must be expiated, <strong>and</strong><br />

when a deity is offended misfortune is not accepted as an excuse.<br />

Recurring variations on these ideas <strong>and</strong> catalogues of exempla illustrating them<br />

leave no room for doubt as to what Ovid thought of the way in which he had<br />

been treated. The message is clear: he was a victim of tyranny <strong>and</strong> injustice.<br />

It is not, however, primarily as a citizen wronged before the law or at all<br />

events in equity that Ovid presents his case, but in his special quality of poet.<br />

This is clearly evident in the elaborate apologia that forms the whole of the<br />

second book of the Tristia; it is also implicit in the poetry itself, often unjustly<br />

belittled by critics, <strong>and</strong> in the very fact that it was through the public medium<br />

of poetry that he chose to appeal. The existence of the Tristia was a demonstration<br />

that Ovid still counted; that his hat, so to say, was still in the ring. Even<br />

a poem that begins by apologizing for the technical deficiencies of his work<br />

(Trist. 4.1.1—2) will modulate into a more positive strain:<br />

utque suum Bacche non sentit saucia uulnus,<br />

dum stupet Idaeis exululata modis,<br />

sic ubi mota calent uiridi mea pectora thyrso,<br />

altior humano spiritus ille malo est;<br />

ille nee exilium Scythici nee litora ponti,<br />

ille nee iratos sentit habere deos. (Trist. 4.1.41—6)<br />

And as a Bacchante though wounded does not know it, so rapt is she while she shrieks<br />

in orgiastic strains, so when my spirit has taken fire, struck with the burgeoning<br />

thyrsus, it rises above human ills; it does not feel exile or the Scythian shore or the<br />

anger of the gods.<br />

A similar apology ushers in Book 5 (5.1.3—4); the promise that follows, to<br />

write in a better <strong>and</strong> happier vein if Augustus will relent (35—46), is another<br />

way of bringing moral pressure to bear. It is a fresh reminder that Ovid, as<br />

445<br />

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

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