K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

170 MAO TSE-TUNG
some strength, he is not on the alert, we should charge him immediately.
Otherwise, we should remain in hiding and quietly await an
opportunity.
2. When, in the course of our march, we encounter enemy outposts
or scouts, we should avoid being seen by them and circle past
them in strict silence. But it we encounter a situation in which we
judge there is an opportunity to be grasped, we should act rapidly
and capture them without firing a shot.
FROM MARX
TO MAO
5. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS DURING A SURPRISE ATTACK
When a guerrilla unit carries out a surprise attack, the disposi-
⋆
tion of its troops should be more or less as follows:
1. We should launch a fierce attack by our main force on the
point in the enemy’s disposition where it hurts the most — a really
swift and resolute sudden blow. We should also send another force
around to carry out energetic action on the enemy’s flanks and in
his rear, in order to confuse his judgement, and prevent him from
fathoming where our main force is located.
2. We should attack one point in the enemy’s disposition with
all our might, but we should also carry out feigned deployments in
other places and make NOT an empty demonstration FOR with a few scattered
soldiers, so as to confuse the enemy’s eyes and ears, and disperse
his forces.
3. If we can COMMERCIAL
determine beforehand the enemy’s line of retreat,
then we should, within the limits of what is possible, send a part of
our forces to intercept him. Ii the enemy has his heavy artillery and
logistic supply installed outside the village, then we should designate
a special small DISTRIBUTION
group to seize them.
4. If the guerrilla unit is numerically strong, it should be divided
into several columns and should carry out the attack from two,
three, or several directions, attempting to cut off the enemy’s retreat,
But we should consider the matter thoroughly, so as to avoid
causing confusion in our own ranks, which might result in erroneously
taking our own troops for those of the enemy. Because of this
possibility, it is necessary, in advance of the action, to agree on signals.
5. In the case of a surprise attack on the enemy, if there is reason
to fear that enemy reinforcements may arrive from a certain di-