K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

364 MAO TSE-TUNG
24 liang.). In 1939 there was a sudden increase to 190,000 packs.
In 1940, the figure was 230,000 packs, and in 1941 there was another
abrupt increase to 299,068 packs. By September 1942 the total
was 155,790 packs, and it is estimated that another 70,000-80,000
packs can be sold in the last three months, making a total of 230,000-
240,000 packs. These statistics reflect two important facts: the first
is the external demand, and the second is our hard work. Some comrades
cannot see that external demand is determined by the War of
Resistance and that within certain limits salt can be sold. Therefore,
they propose that things should follow their own course and
that there is no need for the Party and government to interfere. Other
comrades merely ascribe the yearly increase in the sale of salt to
FROM MARX
TO MAO
external demand and do not recognize that the leadership of the Party
⋆
and government is a great factor in that increase. We began to pay
attention to the salt industry in autumn 1940. As well as the objective
factor of the external salt famine and depletion of salt stocks,
which made 1941 salt sales particularly good, the abrupt increase
from 230,000 packs in 1940 to 299,000 packs in 1941 was also due
to the subjective factor that we implemented through the policy of
supervising transport in that year. Apart from the fact that external
demand was not as urgent as in 1941, the sudden drop to 230,000-
240,000 packs in 1942 from the previous year’s 299,000 was due to
our abandonment of the NOT policy of supervising FOR transport (putting an
end to the many plans made by the people for transporting salt). If
we do not learn a lesson from this, we shall repeat past mistakes in
future work. Certainly COMMERCIAL
there were defects in the salt-industry work
for 1941. The original plan to transport 600,000 packs was too big.
The Border Region still does not have such a great transport capacity.
The achievement in producing 700,000 packs of salt was good,
but the quality [of DISTRIBUTION
the salt] was too poor. Supervision of transport
was correct but it was unnecessary to mobilize everyone everywhere.
There were also many abuses in the organization and method of mobilization
which did not accord with the actual situation. All these
things were shortcomings and mistakes in our work in 1941. Nevertheless,
adopting a policy of active development of the salt industry
was entirely correct. Belittling, misunderstanding and even opposing
this policy is entirely wrong.
What should be done in 1943? First we must determine a policy
for active development. In the current situation in the Border Region,
we certainly cannot adopt a negative approach towards salt