K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

248 MAO TSE-TUNG
of resistance. They are co-operating strategically. For example,
the guerrillas in Manchuria had no functions of strategic co-operation
with regular forces until the war in China started. Since that
time, their function of strategic co-operation is evident, for if they
can kill one enemy, make the enemy expend one round of ammunition,
or hinder one enemy group in its advance southward, our powers
of resistance here are proportionately increased. Such guerrilla
action has a positive action on the enemy nation and on its troops,
while, at the same time, it encourages our own countrymen. Another
example of strategic co-operation is furnished by the guerrillas
who operate along the Ping-Sui, Ping-Han, Chin-Pu, Tung-Pu,
and Cheng-Tai railways. This co-operation began when the invader
FROM MARX
TO MAO
attacked, continued during the period when he held garrisoned cit-
⋆
ies in the areas, and was intensified when our regular forces counterattacked,
in an effort to restore the lost territories.
As an example of tactical co-operation, we may cite the operations
at Hsing-Kou, when guerrillas both north and south of Yeh Men
destroyed the Tung-Pu railway and the motor roads near Ping Hosing
Pass and Yang Fang Kou. A number of small operating base
were established, and organized guerrilla action in Shansi complemented
the activities of the regular forces both there and in the defence
of Honan. Similarly, during the south Shantung campaign,
guerrillas in the five northern NOT provinces FOR co-operated with the army’s
operation on the Hsuchow front.
Guerrilla commanders in rear areas and those in command of
regiments assigned COMMERCIAL
to operate with regular units must co-operate in
accordance with the situation. It is their function to determine weak
points in the enemy dispositions, harass them, to disrupt their transport,
and to undermine their morale. If guerrilla actions were independent,
the results DISTRIBUTION
to be obtained from tactical co-operation would
be lost and those that result from strategic co-operation greatly diminished.
In order to accomplish their mission and improve the
degree of co-operation, guerrilla units must be equipped with some
means of rapid communication. For this purpose, two way radio
sets are recommended.
Guerrilla forces in the immediate battle area are responsible for
close co-operation with regular forces. Their principal functions
are to hinder enemy transport to gather information, and to act as
outposts and sentinels. Even without precise instructions from the
commander of the regular forces, these missions, as well as any oth-