K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

240 MAO TSE-TUNG
The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route
Army and other units have since adopted it.
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long
in the enemy’s rear. Such a belief reveals a lack of comprehension
of the relationship that should exist between the people and the
troops. The former may be likened to water; the latter to the fish
who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together?
It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their
enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.
We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing
his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration,
and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands.
FROM MARX
TO MAO
If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our en-
⋆
emy.
7. THE STRATEGY OF GUERRILLA
RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN
It has been definitely decided that in the strategy of our war
against Japan, guerrilla strategy must be auxiliary to fundamental
conventional methods. If this were a small country, guerrilla activities
could be carried NOT out close to FOR the scene of operations of the
regular army and directly complementary to them. In such a case,
there would be no question of guerrilla strategy as such. Nor would
the question arise COMMERCIAL
if our country were as strong as Russia, for example,
and able speedily to eject an invader. The question exists
because China, a weak country of vast size, has today progressed to
the point where it has become possible to adopt the policy of a protracted
war characterized DISTRIBUTION
by guerrilla operations. Although these
may at first glance seem to be abnormal or heterodox, such is actually
not the case.
Because Japanese military power is inadequate, much of the territory
her armies have overrun is without sufficient garrison troops.
Under such circumstances, the primary functions of guerrillas are
three: first, to conduct a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of
the enemy; second, to establish bases; and, last, to extend the war
areas. Thus, guerrilla participation in the war is not merely a matter
of purely local guerrilla tactics but involves strategic considerations.