K. This is the 1st working draft of vol. VI. It still ... - From Marx to Mao

252 MAO TSE-TUNG
tack and defence. In general, the enemy, in an endeavour to consolidate
his gains, will attempt to extinguish guerrilla bases by dispatching
numerous bodies of troops over a number of different
routes. This must be anticipated and the encirclement broken by
counter-attacks. As such, enemy columns are without reserves, we
should plan on using our main forces to attack one of them by surprise
and devote our secondary effort to continual hindrance and
harassment. At the same time, other forces should isolate enemy
garrison troops and operate on their lines of supply and communication.
When one column has been disposed of, we may turn our
attention to one of the others. In a base area as large as Wu Tat
Shan, for example, there are four or five military sub-divisions.
FROM MARX
TO MAO
Guerrillas in these sub-divisions must co-operate to form a primary
⋆
force to counter-attack the enemy, or the area from which he came,
while a secondary force harasses and hinders him.
After defeating the enemy in any area, we must take advantage
of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks.
We must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning.
We must confine our operations to relatively small areas and
destroy the enemy and traitors in those places.
When the inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted,
trained, equipped, and organized, our operations may be extended
to include cities NOT and lines of communication FOR not strongly held.
We may hold these at least for temporary (if not for permanent) periods.
All these are our duties in offensive strategy. Their object is
to lengthen the period COMMERCIAL
that the enemy must remain on the defensive.
Then our military activities and our organization work among the
masses of the people must be zealously expanded; and with equal
zeal, the strength of the enemy attacked and diminished. It is of
great importance DISTRIBUTION
that guerrilla units be rested and instructed. During
such times when the enemy is on the defensive, the troops may
get some rest and instruction may be carried out.
The development of mobile warfare is not only possible but essential.
This is the case because our current war is a desperate and
protracted struggle. If China were able to conquer the Japanese bandits
speedily and to recover her lost territories, there would be no
question of long-term war on a national scale. Hence, there would
no question of the relation of guerrilla warfare and the war of movement.
Exactly the opposite is actually the case. In order to ensure
the development of guerrilla hostilities into mobile warfare of a con-