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Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

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150 Anwar Shah <strong>and</strong> Chunli Shen<br />

Informed Budgetary Decision Making<br />

Performance budgeting cannot be expected to be a mechanistic, rational system<br />

that replaces the political process of making resource choices in a complex<br />

environment of competing dem<strong>and</strong>s. Instead, it brings more economic values<br />

into budgetary decision making <strong>and</strong> fosters an information-based deliberation<br />

process that assigns significant weight to performance information <strong>and</strong><br />

rewards good performance with managerial flexibility <strong>and</strong> other incentives.<br />

Unrealistic expectations for performance budgeting, by creating a direct <strong>and</strong><br />

explicit link between resource allocation <strong>and</strong> budget results (Broom 1995;<br />

Martin 1997), explain why many scholars are pessimistic about performance<br />

budgeting practices (Kelly 2003; Lu 1998; Pitsvada <strong>and</strong> LoStracco 2002):<br />

there is almost never any link between performance <strong>and</strong> resource allocation<br />

in real life. Indeed, a one-to-one direct link between performance <strong>and</strong><br />

budget allocation is neither possible nor desirable.<br />

Rational analysis <strong>and</strong> quantitative data are insufficient to drive out<br />

political concerns <strong>and</strong> value judgments in making budgetary decisions.<br />

The bid for rationality ignores the political nature of public budgeting.<br />

<strong>Budgeting</strong> is an ever-evolving flow <strong>and</strong> mix of programs <strong>and</strong> solutions<br />

considered by a variety of actors annually or biennially. The final budget<br />

represents the culmination of the interrelationships of actors <strong>and</strong> information<br />

(Rubin 2000). The politics of budgeting makes it infeasible for decision<br />

makers to use only rational data to allocate resources. To some extent, it is<br />

irrational to seek rational <strong>and</strong> comprehensive approaches to budgeting<br />

(Wildavsky 1979). Kelly (2003: 310) reviews public budgeting reforms in<br />

the 20th century <strong>and</strong> concludes that “for all their promise to take politics<br />

out of public budgeting, they amounted to tinkering.”<br />

It is also not desirable to pursue direct links between performance <strong>and</strong><br />

resource allocation, because performance information does not constitute a<br />

sufficient basis for making budgetary decisions. First, performance data are<br />

about what happened in the past, whereas budgetary decisions refer to what<br />

should be done in the future. Thus, past performance at best serves as only<br />

one factor to guide future directions. Also, budgetary decisions involve value<br />

judgments. Past performance information provides some basis for considering<br />

what future priorities should be, so policy makers need to take into<br />

account the divergent views of a range of stakeholders about what future<br />

actions are most appropriate (Perrin 2002). Furthermore, a number of other<br />

factors come into play. For instance, certain government programs, even<br />

when they are poorly performed, cannot simply be done away with, owing<br />

to the legal or political imperatives that created the programs in the first

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