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Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

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348 Stephen B. Peterson<br />

The example of the automation of the Ethiopian budget <strong>and</strong> accounts<br />

system provides five key lessons in automating financial reforms in developing<br />

countries:<br />

1. Institutional factors are far more important than the technical choice in<br />

determining the outcome of automation.<br />

2. Information technology should not be the driver of financial reform.<br />

Indeed, if it had been, the Ethiopian reform would probably not have<br />

been implemented.<br />

3. There is no a priori technical reason to favor either an OTS or a custom<br />

solution: the choice depends on the circumstances. However, the opportunities<br />

offered by a custom solution for learning by doing <strong>and</strong> for creation<br />

of ownership provide strong arguments to balance the putative<br />

advantages of an OTS solution.<br />

4. Effective project selection <strong>and</strong> management are major factors in the<br />

success of automation.<br />

5. A financial <strong>and</strong> social cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken in<br />

reviewing a policy of introducing or continuing with a customized system<br />

or upgrading to an OTS solution.<br />

Lesson 1: Important Institutional Factors in Determining the<br />

Outcome of Automation<br />

The literature contends that success of an IFMIS depends on strong high-level<br />

commitment <strong>and</strong> support (Diamond <strong>and</strong> Khemani 2006). Such commitment<br />

is not always to be found in developing countries, where bureaucratic rivalry,<br />

limited technical competence at the top, <strong>and</strong> reluctance to change (which is<br />

often well founded) may all be factors. The example of Ethiopia demonstrates<br />

that even when “saints” (Peterson 1998b) <strong>and</strong> high-level commitment exist,<br />

they do not ensure effective reform, because the middle-level officials have to<br />

implement the change.<br />

The DSA Project managing the Ethiopian reform of budgets, budget<br />

planning, <strong>and</strong> accounts faced benign neglect, <strong>and</strong> in many ways, as described<br />

earlier, this situation benefited the reform. Optimal obscurity can be a key<br />

factor in the success of development projects more broadly. Projects that are<br />

optimally obscure do not have the high expectations <strong>and</strong> scrutiny of highly<br />

visible <strong>and</strong> political projects, which spares them criticism <strong>and</strong> unrealistic<br />

time frames. Optimal obscurity allows projects to learn by doing, to make<br />

mistakes, <strong>and</strong> to progress incrementally. 31 Large-scale OTS IFMISs are not<br />

optimally obscure. They are hugely expensive, which alone makes them

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