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Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

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260 Salvatore Schiavo-Campo<br />

total revenues <strong>and</strong> expenses <strong>and</strong> projections for the next three years. This<br />

statement is published at least three months before the budget is presented<br />

to the parliament <strong>and</strong> is reviewed by a parliamentary committee but not<br />

formally voted.<br />

The problem with fiscal responsibility rules is they are usually a government’s<br />

contract with itself. In a presidential system of government, the<br />

system has extreme difficulty enforcing on itself a fiscal discipline rule when<br />

the chief executive feels the need to violate it, as he or she can always claim<br />

reasons of state <strong>and</strong> unusual needs. In a parliamentary system, where the<br />

government is a creature of the legislature, for the legislature to enforce a<br />

fiscal rule is equivalent to declaring no confidence in its own government.<br />

The issue is thus the oldest issue in contract law: a contract, however freely<br />

entered into, has no legal or practical meaning unless it is enforceable, <strong>and</strong><br />

no enforcement mechanism exists in a government’s contract with itself to<br />

respect certain rules of fiscal behavior.<br />

This reality still allows three situations in which binding fiscal rules may<br />

be useful. First, in countries with a vibrant civil society <strong>and</strong> an active political<br />

exchange, breaking a major <strong>and</strong> public commitment may entail a political<br />

price. Second, in countries with fragile coalition governments, fragmented<br />

decision making, <strong>and</strong> legislative committees acting as a focus for periodic<br />

bargaining, setting up legally binding targets may be effective to limit political<br />

bargaining. Third, <strong>and</strong> probably most relevant, fiscal responsibility rules may<br />

apply to states in a federal country, for in this case the contract enforcement<br />

authority does exist: the national government. In any case, binding fiscal<br />

rules must not be confused with the need to provide aggregate expenditure<br />

ceilings to all line ministries <strong>and</strong> agencies at the start of the budget preparation<br />

process, emphasized in the next section.<br />

Stages of Budget Preparation<br />

In the budget formulation process, close cooperation between the ministry<br />

of finance <strong>and</strong> the top leadership (president’s office or prime minister’s<br />

office) is required. The role of the leadership is to oversee that the budget is<br />

prepared along the policies defined, to arbitrate or smooth over conflicts<br />

between the ministry of finance <strong>and</strong> the line ministries, <strong>and</strong> to ensure that<br />

the relevant stakeholders are appropriately involved in the budget process.<br />

An interministerial committee is needed to tackle crosscutting issues <strong>and</strong><br />

review especially sensitive issues. That being said, a sharp distinction exists<br />

between the three stages of budget preparation: the top-down, bottom-up,<br />

<strong>and</strong> negotiation stages.

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