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Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

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What Would an Ideal <strong>Public</strong> Finance Management System Look Like? 377<br />

The evidence of a linear pathway from one goal to another—<strong>and</strong> hence<br />

from one level to another—is actually quite ambiguous, however. It is not<br />

apparent, for example, that governments always need to progress through<br />

the steps without leapfrogging. Level 1 may not be required before level 2<br />

can be attained—governments could move directly from level 0 to level 2. 16<br />

Furthermore, attaining level 1 does not mean automatic movement to level 2. 17<br />

Finally, because governments face uncertain environments, goals that were<br />

attained in the past (fiscal discipline, for instance) may pose challenges<br />

in the future—requiring some governments to adjust level 2 systems to<br />

combat level 1 problems in some instances. 18<br />

The central point of figure 11.4 still holds even if one does not buy the<br />

basics first argument of step-by-step progression: different goals are associated<br />

with different kinds of systems. Figure 11.5 shows the variations in different<br />

system dimensions more clearly, detailing how key processes might look at<br />

different levels.<br />

It is important to note that processes at each level in figure 11.5 are<br />

related to different kinds of accountability <strong>and</strong> control. Obviously level 0 has<br />

no real accountability or control. Level 1 has accountability for compliance<br />

with the rules of budgeting <strong>and</strong> for the detailed use of inputs in the PFM<br />

system (whether these inputs are financial, personnel oriented, or other).<br />

Level 2 reflects a mixed accountability for compliance <strong>and</strong> input use <strong>and</strong><br />

accountability for results (measured ex post). Level 3 has accountability for<br />

results where there are no ex ante controls (by which managers are held<br />

accountable for their use of inputs), but managers are rather held accountable<br />

for what they do with the money (the results they produce).<br />

Any PFM code needs to recognize that differences between PFM systems<br />

are required in the face of differences in goals being addressed. Thus, there<br />

is not necessarily one right way of structuring a PFM system, <strong>and</strong> there is not<br />

one right set of technical tools or indicators for effective PFM. If a government<br />

is pursuing level 1 fiscal discipline as its primary objective, it should<br />

have a system that looks quite different from that of a government that has<br />

well-established discipline <strong>and</strong> is tackling level 2 <strong>and</strong> level 3 issues of<br />

budgetary efficiency.<br />

This point has multiple implications. One is that the definition of best<br />

practice relevant to a specific government must be seen as contingent on the<br />

kind of goal being addressed in that government. Hence, there is a strong<br />

reason not to derive a PFM code using any best-practice approach. A second<br />

is that any kind of indicator set used to reflect on PFM system quality must<br />

show how the indicator dimensions relate to different levels <strong>and</strong> thus pertain<br />

to different kinds of goal achievement. This is not done in PEFA, which<br />

presents an indicator set that seemingly holds for all governments <strong>and</strong> at all

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