Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

Strengthening Public Expenditure Management in Africa 393
of information technology without complementary changes in the incentives
framework has proven to be ineffective, not only in customs, 7 but also
in public sector management in general. The same is true of better training
of customs officials, when the issue is not their insufficient skill but dishonesty
combined with inadequate oversight. Changes in the incentive framework
may include giving more authority to lower-level customs officers to make
routine decisions, thus limiting the excessive involvement of higher-level
officials. A bonus system linked to actual customs duties collected may
perhaps also be considered. However, all of these measures have a spotty
record of success and carry risks as well as potential benefits. In particular,
bonuses to customs collectors (like all tax farming) generate abuses of
power and destructive competition for the jobs to which they are attached,
thus eroding government legitimacy. Cleaning up customs has proven a
tough challenge in every country. In general, reducing the occasions of faceto-face
contact between traders and customs officials serves to shrink the
opportunities for bribery and extortion. However, careful consideration of
all implications is needed before any action is taken, and a package of modest,
mutually reinforcing measures has proven more effective than searching for
a “magic bullet.”
In the mid-1980s, much improvement was expected from the introduction
of preshipment import inspection (PSI). Regrettably, although
with occasional good results, PSI has not materially reduced corruption in
customs, and the high fees to PSI firms were not always justified by higher
customs proceeds. Generally, improving efficiency and integrity in the
government customs agency is preferable to investing substantial hopes
and resources in PSI. In postconflict African countries, however,
outsourcing customs operations altogether for a transitional period may
be advisable—following the “Crown Agents model” (whichever firm is
actually contracted for this purpose)—provided that the contractor has,
as a central responsibility, the training of local officials so that at the end
of the transitional period the government has acquired its own efficient
customs organization.
Local Government and Petty Corruption
One should not look for public financial irregularities only in central
government. In most African and other countries, local governments and
municipalities are also a source of the problem, with bribes required to
obtain most services, permits, certifications, or licenses. The magnitude of
corruption may be less, but its effect on the everyday life of citizens may be