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Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

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502 Alta Fölscher<br />

Background to Reforms<br />

The constitution provides the institutional framework for budget reforms<br />

in South Africa. It details the structure of the new state; provides a framework<br />

for expenditure <strong>and</strong> revenue assignment; sets out key institutions,<br />

roles, <strong>and</strong> responsibilities; <strong>and</strong> establishes the principle of cooperative governance,<br />

which sets the tone for a consensus-seeking budget process. However,<br />

the constitution largely leaves further national legislation <strong>and</strong> practice to<br />

sort out how these principles are given effect.<br />

At the time of the democratic transition in 1994, the new government did<br />

not start with a clean fiscal slate. In fiscal year 1992/93, the main budget’s net<br />

borrowing requirement had reached 8.7 percent of gross domestic product<br />

(GDP), <strong>and</strong> in fiscal year 1994/95, public debt rose to almost 47 percent of GDP<br />

(from a level of approximately 30 percent 10 years earlier), leaving very little<br />

fiscal room for the state to improve the equity of public services. The annual<br />

budgeting system that the new government inherited provided inadequate<br />

tools with which to stabilize fiscal balances <strong>and</strong> manage the required policy<br />

shifts. The system was highly fragmented, not only in terms of a delinking of<br />

policy, budgeting, <strong>and</strong> implementation, but also institutionally, increasing<br />

budgeting uncertainty, lack of clarity, <strong>and</strong> the scope for budget games. It<br />

planned <strong>and</strong> controlled for inputs <strong>and</strong> cash, with limited opportunity for systematically<br />

assessing the effectiveness <strong>and</strong> efficiency of spending or for relating<br />

allocations directly to policy. It was not transparent, with poor underlying<br />

information systems, hidden spending, <strong>and</strong> inadequate mechanisms to<br />

extract good information for use in the budget process <strong>and</strong> for accountability<br />

purposes. The budget process itself was largely incremental, offering insufficient<br />

opportunity for the new government to identify ongoing nonpriority<br />

activities <strong>and</strong> create fiscal room for higher priorities. <strong>Accountability</strong> was procedural,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the system was plagued by deeply entrenched inefficiencies.<br />

The new structure of state also required a system rethink. Compared<br />

with a complex state with parallel structures of government serving different<br />

population groups, the new South Africa was a unitary state with three interdependent<br />

but distinct spheres of government: national, provincial, <strong>and</strong><br />

local. The constitution assigns to each of the three spheres of government<br />

certain functions, which may be concurrent (shared responsibility between<br />

spheres) or exclusive (sole responsibility of the unit of government). The<br />

national government’s main role is policy making, regulation, <strong>and</strong> oversight.<br />

It also administers exclusive functions (for example,justice,defense,<strong>and</strong> foreign<br />

affairs). Provinces are mainly responsible for social delivery, either concurrently<br />

with national government (for example, primary <strong>and</strong> secondary education,

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