Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

448 Salvatore Schiavo-Campo
serious impediment to capacity building.Because the underlying inequity
is inherent in the difference in incomes and salary scales between the
postconflict developing country and the foreign country (typically an
industrial country), it is a regrettable necessity to establish an intermediate
compensation level that will limit both types of entirely understandable
resentment at being paid less than others doing the same job.
Insist that the terms of reference of expatriate experts include a compulsory
and central component of knowledge transfer to the local staff. If
possible, explore twinning local staff members to expatriate experts.
Ascertain that the line ministry or government agency has given explicit
consideration to whether consulting firms or individual consultants
would be more cost-effective for the assignment.
Most important, inquire whether a strategy exists for reducing dependence
on expatriate services in the medium term, and, if it does not, encourage
its early formulation—in light of the need to combine short-term needs
with longer-term institutional development and, hence, achieve an
eventual reduction in dependence on expatriate consultants.
Screening requests for transfer payments
Subsidies should generally be provided on the basis of affordability and in
accordance with social and political criteria, but five technical tests may be
suggested. These tests are the same as would apply in nonconflict settings,
but in a postconflict country, the answers must rely far more on quick
application of common sense than on extensive analysis, especially because
some of these subsidies may be critical to reestablishing a measure of confidence
and popular support:
Is the proposed subsidy grounded on law, regulation, or policy? If not, can
transitional but explicit criteria be elaborated?
Is the expenditure request for the particular subsidy reasonably likely to
achieve the stated objective?
Do methods other than budgetary subsidies exist to achieve the same
objective?
Is the administration of the subsidy cost-effective (for example, is better
targeting a realistic possibility)?
Most important, do the administrative modalities provide reasonable
assurance that the subsidy will reach the intended beneficiaries, including
reality spot-checks with the intended beneficiaries themselves?
Several other transfers are needed in postconflict transition—for
internally displaced persons, former combatants, and the like. No general