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Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

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Country Case Study: South Africa 531<br />

framework, considerably more leeway exists for action in cases of poor<br />

performance than is being taken.<br />

Effective medium-term planning at the departmental level cannot be<br />

taken for granted. A lot of work needs to be done to realize the benefits of a<br />

medium-term planning horizon. The medium-term allocations stop at the<br />

program level, with financial planning lower down still being done largely<br />

on an annual basis. Deepening the reforms in this direction would require<br />

working with individual departments at the national <strong>and</strong> provincial levels<br />

to develop managerial capacities. The South African process allowed for that<br />

approach, <strong>and</strong> major reforms were implemented over a number of years.<br />

Table 15.1 shows the pace at which the reclassification of the budget <strong>and</strong><br />

redevelopment of the chart of accounts were implemented.<br />

Donaldson (2006: 4) notes that recent South African budget <strong>and</strong> policy<br />

reform history is marked by some successful reforms. However, many cases<br />

of ineffective or delayed reforms <strong>and</strong> persistent service delivery failures have<br />

also occurred. Although there “may have been cases of policy error, poor<br />

advice, or poorly planned reforms [<strong>and</strong>] cases in which the resource requirements<br />

for successful reform have been too steep, or where key personnel<br />

have not been equal to the task,” these instances are not fundamental barriers<br />

to progress. Donaldson discusses two more fundamental problems, namely,<br />

that the South African reform case is plagued by institutional overload <strong>and</strong><br />

that the assignment of powers <strong>and</strong> some objectives of reforms may have<br />

been incompatible with incentives.<br />

In the case of the first problem, the argument is that in many areas of<br />

public service delivery, significant policy changes have preceded institutional<br />

capacity building, leading to delays <strong>and</strong> ineffective implementation. An<br />

overload of policy obligations has been a significant impediment to successful<br />

transformation of the South African state. This is true for sectoral<br />

reforms as well as for the underlying systemic reforms. However, as is illustrated<br />

in the following discussion on reform of the classification system <strong>and</strong><br />

the chart of accounts, success is more likely when care is taken to systematically<br />

build human resource capacity together with systems capacity.<br />

Donaldson’s second argument touches on a key shortcoming of the<br />

South African reforms: the lack of a credible budget performance management<br />

system <strong>and</strong> lack of alignment between the accountability chain, institutional<br />

governance, managerial incentives, <strong>and</strong> public policy objectives. In<br />

South Africa, efforts to put in place performance management systems were<br />

not well located in a sensible existing framework of accountability, objectives,<br />

<strong>and</strong> performance indicators. Although pockets of sectoral reform progress<br />

exist across the government, the functional devolution of responsibilities <strong>and</strong>

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