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Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Budgeting and ...

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<strong>Budgeting</strong> in Postconflict Countries 443<br />

Aid management is too complex a subject to be recapitulated here. In<br />

postconflict situations, however, a special <strong>and</strong> serious issue is the “sunset<br />

dilemma.” An AMA is necessary in the immediate postconflict period<br />

because the formal government structures do not yet exist or have extremely<br />

limited capacity <strong>and</strong> also because donors require transparent <strong>and</strong> reasonably<br />

corruption-free financial management. Over time, as the regular government<br />

institutions grow, competition emerges between the governmental<br />

structures <strong>and</strong> the parallel AMA. Instead of a smooth h<strong>and</strong>over of responsibility,<br />

the parallel tracks tend to persist, partly because the AMA has built<br />

up greater implementation capacity <strong>and</strong> contacts with donors, <strong>and</strong> partly<br />

because accountability <strong>and</strong> financial transparency remain a must for donors.<br />

Thus, the AMA acquires a technocratic monopoly <strong>and</strong> stays active longer<br />

than envisaged, competing with regular government ministries for resources<br />

<strong>and</strong> authority <strong>and</strong>, in some cases, preventing their strengthening <strong>and</strong><br />

improvement.<br />

The key lesson of this experience is that the government <strong>and</strong> donors<br />

should agree from the outset on a clear sunset clause, by which the special<br />

AMA will be absorbed into the regular structure of government at an appropriate<br />

specific time. An exit strategy for the AMA is necessary. In turn, that<br />

strategy should be linked to appropriate conditionality vis-à-vis the emerging<br />

government structures. Finally, during the same period, concerted assistance<br />

is required to build institutional capacity in the regular organs of<br />

government—because proliferation of weak or corrupt government ministries<br />

is not a sound alternative to a technocratic monopoly of decision<br />

making by the AMA.<br />

Assembling a Government Budget in Postconflict Situations<br />

As noted earlier, simplicity <strong>and</strong> adaptation are the watchwords for<br />

postconflict reconstruction <strong>and</strong> recovery. Nowhere is this truer than in<br />

public expenditure management <strong>and</strong> financial accountability. The priorities<br />

discussed in this section are as basic as the budgeting systems are<br />

dilapidated.<br />

Priority Number One: Protect the Money<br />

In the circumstances typical of the immediate postconflict period, the first<br />

budgeting “reform”priority is to try to ensure that public financial resources,<br />

external or domestic, do not actually disappear. Protecting the public’s<br />

money is the fundamental fiduciary duty of both the government <strong>and</strong> the

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