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Founders at Work.pdf

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Stephen Kaufer 367<br />

Livingston: Did you use the same str<strong>at</strong>egy with other companies: “Try us out<br />

for a month, and, if you feel like we’ve driven some true leads, you’ll continue<br />

with us”?<br />

Kaufer: Yes. Once other companies saw Expedia advertising, they sometimes<br />

didn’t need a free test, but we might say, “Look, our leads are normally a dollar<br />

a click, because they convert so well. But we’ll let you get started <strong>at</strong> a quarter.<br />

And we’ll send you 5,000 leads, and you can test with no risk. But you know,<br />

we’re looking for an insertion order to show th<strong>at</strong> you’re committed to the test.”<br />

Invariably it would take three months to get a test going. You have to find<br />

the right person; you have to introduce yourself; you have to decide whether it’s<br />

an ad agency or direct with the client and lots of other annoying aspects. But for<br />

the most part, once the client was getting the leads, the leads would convert<br />

well enough such th<strong>at</strong> they would be up and stay up for years and years. So<br />

there wasn’t a whole lot of maintenance involved. Our technology would autom<strong>at</strong>ically<br />

find the right links to advertise.<br />

Livingston: It sounds like finally figuring out how you were going to make<br />

money was a major turning point for you.<br />

Kaufer: Right. We went from no revenue to break-even in the course of about<br />

4 months. Th<strong>at</strong> part was a testament to finding a model th<strong>at</strong> worked. To break<br />

even, I had to do $75,000 in revenue for the month, something like th<strong>at</strong>. We<br />

had never let our burn r<strong>at</strong>e grow. We didn’t do any advertising <strong>at</strong> th<strong>at</strong> time. But<br />

even since, we’re rarely going to do promotions th<strong>at</strong> we can’t tie back to actual<br />

revenue-gener<strong>at</strong>ing activities on the site.<br />

Livingston: Why were you so careful about spending money? Had you had a<br />

bad experience before?<br />

Kaufer: By 2000, we’d certainly seen the dot-coms th<strong>at</strong> would move into the<br />

$50-a-square-foot offices, hire loads of people to get it all done quick—to get<br />

big fast, etc. Several of them had already flamed out. Th<strong>at</strong> was really never in<br />

my blood, if you will. The other company I had started right out of college was<br />

self-funded, and then a tiny bit of angel investing, and then half a million dollars,<br />

and then a couple of million dollars, where the last round was purely<br />

growth capital. We had always run th<strong>at</strong> profitably and had grown slowly because<br />

of it.<br />

I guess I had toyed with the idea of doing the same here—taking my savings,<br />

building the product, not looking for any venture money—but th<strong>at</strong> would<br />

have taken a long time. I had a family to support, th<strong>at</strong> sort of stuff. So we certainly<br />

decided early on to go raise some money, and within the first year we had<br />

raised $3 million or so—but a compar<strong>at</strong>ively small amount of money.<br />

There wasn’t anything obvious th<strong>at</strong> we should spend money on, other than<br />

hiring a lot of people, and I’m just a fundamental believer in small teams do<br />

better than big teams. We were building a product, and if there were 5 people<br />

and they were all within shouting distance of each other, they were going to<br />

build a better product than if we had had 15 people. Really, even if I had the<br />

dollars, I didn’t want to spend the money there. And then, did we need more

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