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104Rüdiger Winksectors, Airbus consequently attempts to reduce this level of integration, whereverit makes sense. With the last two civil projects (A380, A350), Airbus tried toextend the strategy of dual and modular sourcing and combine this strategy withinternationalisation. Traditionally, a high number of single components providersproduced small shares within the aircraft value chain with Airbus as the organisationnot only responsible for defining technological requirements but also developingnew products in cooperation with R&D institutes and single suppliers. Thesuppliers look for geographical proximity to Airbus to get a better understandingon the actual needs of their customer and to build a social relationship – as theyinterpreted it – based on personal contacts to representatives of Airbus. All communicationprocesses in these regional clusters, however, are focused on Airbuswith only weak ties between the single suppliers. This traditional supply chainmanagement went under change in the late 1990s. The number of suppliers wasdrastically reduced to few system suppliers. This process has already been realisedparticularly in the segments of engineering service providers and at locationsin the United Kingdom, while segments like cabin interior systems needed additionaltime for adjustment. Suppliers have to offer integrative system products,participate in product development based on formal R&D investments and staff,and take part in the risk of selling the aircrafts for decades. Only big integratedfirms have the necessary financial resources and technological skills for theseoffers. As a consequence, a fierce process of consolidation in the aircraft supplysector started in the 1990s.In contrast to automotive production, internationalisation in the aircraft marketsis restricted by severe public formal quality standards to guarantee safety forthe passengers. Furthermore, learning curve effects are particularly important inthe aircraft sector with newcomers facing the problem of low productivity andquality. As a consequence, reallocation of production into low-cost countries isnot as usual as in other industries and restricted to more standardised processeswith a low share of aeronautics-specific technologies. As a general strategy, however,reallocations to other countries is not only welcome to reduce costs butparticularly to increase sales markets, because many countries use local contentrequirements as trade policy instruments in the aircraft markets. Consequently, ahigh share of the BOEING 7E7 “Dreamliner” was produced in Japan, and a possiblenew assembly site of Airbus in China was also closely connected to salesof the A320. Further shares of local content requirements are realised by foreigndirect investments of suppliers. To overcome the risks of internationalisation withoutloosing its potential, Airbus used its demand power against the suppliers toencourage them to relocate production. Chosen destinations so far are for exampleMiddle and Eastern European countries for German and French companies, NorthAfrica for French and Spanish companies, and Asia and South Africa for Britishcompanies. The suppliers have to cope with the problem to meet the formalised