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On the fragility of associational life: A constitutive liberal’s response to Patrick Lenta 131<br />

which involves discrimination on the basis of communal relations.<br />

However, it is Lenta's subsequent treatment of Amos v Corporation of the<br />

Presiding Bishop that makes it patently clear that he has little patience for<br />

line drawing that might tip the balance of a discrimination dispute in<br />

favour of a religious association. Lenta writes:<br />

In Amos, a janitor employed for 16 years at a Mormon-run gymnasium was<br />

dismissed for his failure to meet the requirements for a certificate of eligibility<br />

for attendance at Mormon temples. The dismissal clearly constituted job<br />

discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation, prohibited under Title VII.<br />

The janitor challenged the constitutionality of section 702 exemption<br />

inasmuch as it permitted religious associations to discriminate on religious<br />

grounds in hiring for non-religious positions, into which category his own job<br />

fell. The District Court ruled that the amendment to the Title VII exemption<br />

was unconstitutional because it enhanced the ability of religious associations<br />

to further their beliefs in situations where 'people's opportunity to earn a<br />

living is at stake. 43<br />

The District Court's ruling is consistent with Basson J's holding in Strydom<br />

that certain jobs (typists, for example) are so distant from the doctrinal core<br />

of the church's activities as to render an exemption from antidiscrimination<br />

legislation unwarranted. A unanimous US Supreme Court,<br />

however, declined to follow the District Court. In his concurring<br />

judgment, Brennan J observed that 'religious organisations have an interest<br />

in autonomy in ordering their religious affairs'. 44 Brennan J … decided that<br />

… [it] would be inappropriate since it would involve 'ongoing government<br />

entanglement in religious affairs' which could result in a religious<br />

organisation being 'chilled in its free exercise activity'. 45 He expands on<br />

<strong>this</strong> point as follows:<br />

While a church may regard the conduct of certain functions as integral to its<br />

mission, a court may disagree. A religious organisation therefore would have<br />

an incentive to characterise as religious only those activities about which there<br />

likely would be no dispute, even if it genuinely believed that religious<br />

commitment was important in performing other tasks as well. As a result, the<br />

community's process of self-definition would be shaped in part by the<br />

prospects of litigation. 46<br />

Brennan J concluded that the 'categorical exemption' contained in section<br />

702 (as amended) covering all types of church employee, no matter what<br />

the job, appropriately balances the right of employees to religious liberty<br />

and the autonomy of religious organisations. 47 In contradistinction to the<br />

43<br />

Amos v Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 594 F Supp 791, 818 (Utah 1984).<br />

44 Amos v Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 483 US 327, 340 (1987).<br />

45 Amos (n 44 above) 343.<br />

46<br />

Amos (n 44above) 343-344.<br />

47 Amos (n 44 above) 345-346.

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