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304 Chapter 13<br />

The institutional competence of the courts is the consideration on<br />

which the South African courts set most store in the adjudication of socioeconomic<br />

rights. As discussed in more detail below, <strong>this</strong> contrasts with the<br />

approach of the courts to the adjudication of civil and political rights, where<br />

the Constitutional Court has held that deference to the ‘practical difficulties’<br />

faced by the administration, does not mean that decision makers should not<br />

be held to account for infringement of constitutional rights: ‘It is the<br />

remedy that must adapt itself to the right, not the right to the remedy.’ 61<br />

In socio-economic rights adjudication, by contrast, it appears to be that the<br />

right is shaped by the remedy.<br />

2.3 The nature of the subject matter<br />

The third consideration relates to the nature of the subject matter under<br />

review. There are a number of ways in which <strong>this</strong> can affect the level of<br />

deference applied by a court. First, where the action is one characterised by<br />

greater political discretion, courts will tend to be more deferential to the<br />

decision-making of the executive or legislature. One of the clearest decisions<br />

demonstrating <strong>this</strong> consideration is found in the British decision of A v Secretary<br />

of State for the Home Department, where Lord Bingham expressly stated that one<br />

of the reasons for affording deference to the executive in its conclusion that<br />

the United Kingdom is facing a ‘threat to the life of the nation’ is because <strong>this</strong> is<br />

a ‘pre-eminently political judgment’:<br />

The more purely political (in a broad or narrow sense) a question is, the more<br />

appropriate it will be for political resolution and the less likely it is to be an<br />

appropriate matter for judicial decision. The smaller, therefore, will be the<br />

potential role of the court. It is the function of political and not judicial<br />

bodies to resolve political questions. Conversely, the greater the legal content<br />

of any issue, the greater the potential role of the court, because under our<br />

Constitution and subject to the sovereign power of parliament it is the<br />

function of the courts and not of political bodies to resolve legal questions. 62<br />

This simple distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘political’ questions, however,<br />

threatens to unravel, particularly where two competing rights or interests are at<br />

play. The example above, for instance, begs the question: Why is the<br />

interpretation of what constitutes a ‘threat to the life of the nation’ purely a<br />

political question where it also constitutes a statutory pre-condition for<br />

legitimate derogations from the HRA? Surely <strong>this</strong> could be characterised<br />

equally as a legal question? The decision by a court to label a matter<br />

‘political’, therefore, will often be used as a mask for a prior decision to afford<br />

the decision-maker a high level of deference, based on one of the other two<br />

factors, or even on a non-principled factor, such as an unwillingness to<br />

61<br />

Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 186.<br />

62 n 31 above, para 29.

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