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Rationaliy is dead! Long live rationality! Saving rational basis review 21<br />

The departure is even more obvious in S v Ntuli. 104 Didcott J found<br />

irrational a law that required unrepresented prisoners to get a judge’s<br />

certificate before appealing their conviction while imposing no similar<br />

requirement on represented prisoners or convicted people not in jail. The<br />

purpose of the provision was to prevent appeals that were ‘lodged<br />

frivolously with a view to no gain but the opportunity for an excursion to<br />

court and some temporary relief from the tedium of imprisonment’. 105<br />

Without much analysis, Justice Didcott concluded that the scheme<br />

violated the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 106 But the minimal<br />

rationality standard would have upheld <strong>this</strong> law easily as, although some<br />

appeals by unrepresented prisoners would have been genuine and some<br />

appeals by the other classes of citizens would have been frivolous, the law<br />

would have partially furthered its end by preventing some frivolous<br />

appeals.<br />

The results in Cleburne, Van der Merwe and Ntuli can only be explained<br />

if courts adopt one, or some, combination of the following more<br />

demanding tests: (a) require the means to substantially further the end; (b)<br />

require a reason for why the state has focused only on one group and not<br />

others to achieve the end; or (c) balance the achievement of the end against<br />

the harm it causes. These methods – or similar formulations – not only<br />

explain existing precedent but also provide standards for future<br />

application. The problem is that they necessarily require courts to<br />

adjudicate on the extent to which a law must further an end or the wisdom<br />

of a legislative choice to single out a particular group. While they can still be<br />

applied with deference, they cannot be applied without discretion.<br />

4.4 The differentiation<br />

The discussion up to now has covered the well-trodden terrain of the<br />

difficulty in determining what purposes are legitimate, defining purposes<br />

and setting an appropriate level of scrutiny. But the rational basis test can<br />

be made to vacillate between competing goals in a fourth way: The<br />

specificity with which the law being challenged is defined. In essence, <strong>this</strong><br />

reflects the insights about the degree of abstraction of purpose and the<br />

simultaneous serving of multiple purposes and applies them to the way the<br />

law is understood. There are two basic ways in which the law can be defined<br />

in order to induce a different result: it can be considered outside the context<br />

of other statutory provisions; only the general provision is considered.<br />

In Union of Refugee Women, 107 the majority of the Constitutional Court<br />

upheld a section of a statute 108 that permitted only citizens and permanent<br />

104<br />

n 22 above.<br />

105 S v Ntuli (n 22 above) para 22.<br />

106 S v Ntuli (n 22 above) para 20.<br />

107<br />

Union of Refugee Women (n 27 above).<br />

108 Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 sec 23(1)(a).

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