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368 Chapter 16<br />

of adjudication. 4 The first part of the article discusses the relationship between<br />

theory and practice in golf. The important conclusion of <strong>this</strong> discussion is<br />

reached when Woolman asserts ‘what is true for golf is true for the law’, 5 as<br />

both are social enterprises that require feedback, ‘coaching’ and improvement<br />

through practice. Woolman then proceeds to engage with the debate<br />

concerning theory in law between Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish where<br />

again a sporting analogy surfaces (between law and baseball <strong>this</strong> time). The<br />

upshot of <strong>this</strong> discussion appears to be that even in as physical and applied a<br />

sport as baseball, theory and practice are intertwined: ‘Theory and practice fit<br />

hand in glove in sports such as golf and baseball as much as they do in<br />

endeavors such as legal theory and legal adjudication.’ 6 The claim is not<br />

that, whilst actively engaged in ‘playing the game’ one is consciously aware<br />

of theory, but rather that the hours of practice and theorising create<br />

dispositional states that enable a player to improve their performance. The same<br />

is true with law: According to Woolman, theory can help condition the<br />

dispositions that judges have in deciding cases. It is thus indispensable in<br />

helping to improve the judgments that result though it should not be reified<br />

either.<br />

Woolman then moves on to engage with judicial practice in South<br />

African law. He makes several arguments against judicial minimalism,<br />

arguing that even a key proponent of minimalism such as Sunstein appears<br />

in recent work to have had doubts about its usefulness. Judges are ultimately<br />

‘“choice architects”: They frame the environment within which we<br />

citizens operate’. 7 As such, they cannot be neutral in what they do.<br />

‘Understanding one’s environment, testing what works and what doesn’t<br />

work in that environment, putting positive results of one’s experiments into<br />

practice, being a choice architect – now that is a virtue.’ 8<br />

In light of <strong>this</strong> message, Woolman believes that the appropriate<br />

approach for judges to adopt is an experimentalist one. This involves a<br />

dialogue between different organs of state, participation of affected parties<br />

and a constant openness to changing norms in light of different<br />

circumstances. The key guiding principle for constitutional norms is the<br />

idea of understanding the context and testing what works or does not work<br />

within that context as well as an openness to changing norms ‘when the<br />

exigencies of the moment require such change’. 9<br />

4 The original piece to which <strong>this</strong> responds has undergone several revisions. We have<br />

sought to adapt our response to the extent possible to the latest draft we have received.<br />

5<br />

S Woolman ‘On the common saying “What’s true in golf is true in law”. The relationship<br />

between theory and practice across forms of life’ in S Woolman & D Bilchitz (eds) Is <strong>this</strong><br />

seat taken? Conversations at the Bar, the bench and the academy about the South African<br />

Constitution (2012) 341.<br />

6 Woolman (n 5 above) 354.<br />

7 Woolman (n 5 above) 358.<br />

8<br />

Woolman (n 5 above) 358.<br />

9 Woolman (n 5 above) 362.

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