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222 Chapter 9<br />

But I am getting ahead of myself. First, let us contrast dignity and ubuntu<br />

with a broad brush, as they have often been painted in the literature. Dignity<br />

is usually associated with individual human rights, with a strong emphasis on<br />

autonomy and personhood, while ubuntu is associated with communalism<br />

and such virtues as loyalty and generosity. When it comes to<br />

constitutional law in South Africa, however, what they have in common is<br />

that neither seems easily reconcilable with reigning notions of legal<br />

positivism. That said, ubuntu has been more persistently attacked as<br />

supposedly untranslatable into a judiciable principle of constitutional law.<br />

This is in part because dignity is clearly more familiar to Westerners and<br />

more easily accepted by those scholars in South Africa trained in Germany<br />

or in German law. For modern legal systems such as those of Germany<br />

and Israel, dignity is a foundational principle. Article One of Germany’s<br />

1948 post-war Basic Law makes human dignity an inviolable right and one<br />

that is to inform the spirit of the legal system as a whole. The 1992 Israeli<br />

Basic Law makes human dignity a fundamental moral ideal and a right<br />

within the Israeli legal system. In international law, meanwhile, the 1948<br />

Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes the dignity of all<br />

persons as the basis for freedom and justice in the world.<br />

Dignity then, at least since World War II, has a rich legal history – one<br />

that has certainly played a role in the development of the dignity<br />

jurisprudence in South Africa, and many of us have argued that the depth<br />

and breadth of the dignity jurisprudence is one of the most significant<br />

contributions of South African constitutionalism. Can the same be said of<br />

ubuntu? The answer is yes and no. Certainly one does not find ubuntu in the<br />

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the other hand, if one puts<br />

ubuntu in the rich tradition of African humanism and socialism – and I<br />

think it should be connected to <strong>this</strong> intellectual heritage – then ubuntu (and similar<br />

African ethical principles such as Ujamaa in Tanzania) has a very rich<br />

history indeed, and one that places such principles at the heart of the<br />

creation of a post-colonial Africa.<br />

Given the troubled history of constitutionalism in Africa, the<br />

legalisation of such principles has been mixed, yet they clearly play a major<br />

role in defining the grundnorm of an ethic for a new society. A grundnorm is<br />

Hans Kelsen’s word for the grounding moral or ethical principle that<br />

undergirds not only the legal system but the society as a whole. 3 Such a<br />

grundnorm was explicitly defended by many of the African leaders after the<br />

revolutionary struggles for independence through principles of African<br />

Humanism such as Ujamaa and ubuntu.<br />

It is an honour to present <strong>this</strong> essay in the company of Justice Mokgoro<br />

who has played such an important role in what Sam Fuller and I have<br />

named the ‘recognition’ of ubuntu by the Constitutional Court. Justice<br />

3 H Kelsen General theory of law and the state (1945).

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