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16<br />

David<br />

CHAPTER<br />

THEORY, PRACTICE AND<br />

THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE:<br />

A REPLY TO<br />

STU WOOLMAN<br />

Bilchitz* and Juha Tuovinen**<br />

1 Introduction<br />

We face a revolt from theory, in law and across the rest of the intellectual landscape. 1<br />

The role of theory in law is a topic that has generated much heated debate,<br />

particularly in the United States. In South Africa, <strong>this</strong> debate has largely<br />

taken the form of academic exchanges concerning the virtues of judicial<br />

minimalism: This involves the idea that in adjudicating cases, judges should<br />

confine themselves to providing reasons that are narrowly tailored to the<br />

facts before them and are not to go beyond what is necessary to justify that<br />

decision. 2 This debate has taken place in the context of criticisms that have<br />

been lodged against the Constitutional Court for avoiding giving content to<br />

fundamental rights and its failure to provide more detailed and deeper<br />

justifications for its decisions. 3<br />

In the article titled ‘On the common saying “What’s true in golf is true in<br />

law”: The relationship between theory and practice across forms of life’,<br />

Woolman attempts to capture the relationship between theory and the practice<br />

* Associate Professor, University of Johannesburg and Director, South African Institute for<br />

Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC, a<br />

Centre of the University of Johannesburg).<br />

** Researcher, SAIFAC, a Centre of the University of Johannesburg.<br />

1 R Dworkin Justice in robes (2006) 72.<br />

2 Of course, what is necessary to justify a particular decision is itself contentious and<br />

will be the subject of discussion later in <strong>this</strong> piece. Currie leaves <strong>this</strong> point undecided,<br />

stating that he ‘[has] not had an opportunity to explore in any depth the pragmatic and<br />

political virtues of minimalism’ I Currie ‘Judicious avoidance’ (1999) SAJHR 138 165;<br />

see also C Roederer ‘Judicious engagement: Theory, attitude and community’ (1999)<br />

SAJHR 486.<br />

3 See, eg, A Cockrell ‘Rainbow jurisprudence’ (1996) SAJHR 13; D Bilchitz Poverty and<br />

fundamental rights (2007); S Woolman ‘The amazing, vanishing bill of rights’ (2007)<br />

SALJ 762.<br />

367

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