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Does transformative constitutionalism require the recognition of animal rights? 207<br />

to show how they could provide support for the extension of rights to<br />

animals. I also provided a number of arguments as to why we should adopt<br />

a presumption in favour of recognising that non-human animals have<br />

equal worth and why we should be suspicious of judgments of differential<br />

worth. Equal worth does not, however, require identical treatment and I<br />

outlined the way in which equality could be applied beyond the human<br />

species.<br />

Finally, I considered the difficult question where human and animal<br />

rights conflict. In particular, the problem arises in that human society,<br />

whilst extremely powerful with respect to animals, is not yet ready to<br />

recognise the full implications of animal rights. I outlined two strategies to<br />

address <strong>this</strong> problem both rooted in concepts based in the South African<br />

Constitution. The first involves the notion of ‘progressive realisation’ which<br />

I argue can be adapted to the context of animal rights. It would involve a<br />

recognition that the full realisation of such rights may not be possible now<br />

though a minimum core of such rights must be protected. Progressive<br />

steps must be taken towards the full realisation of such rights over time.<br />

Secondly, I argue that the general limitations clause of the Constitution<br />

provides important principles that should be used when considering<br />

limits on animal rights and dealing with circumstances of conflict. In<br />

particular, the proportionality test provides a rubric for considering the<br />

differing interests and their respective weight. The ‘less restrictive means’<br />

requirement would also be of great importance to ensuring that the<br />

extension of rights to animals makes a difference to animal lives without<br />

going too far beyond what society is prepared to accept in <strong>this</strong> regard.<br />

The interpretation of the Constitution I have defended is one that draws<br />

out the deepest principles of the new constitutional order and applies them<br />

in a way that would perhaps surprise many in our society. Yet, <strong>this</strong> should<br />

not be a reason to refuse to acknowledge the power of the argument or<br />

the interpretation provided. The Constitution was not designed to<br />

entrench the status quo: It was designed to transform our society into<br />

something different, to allow ourselves to imagine a social order based on<br />

firm principles of justice and equality. Leaving out animals would be<br />

completely inimical to <strong>this</strong> ethos and perpetrate unjustifiable<br />

discrimination in the new order. It is time, both philosophically and in<br />

concrete terms, to take the logic of fundamental rights to its ultimate<br />

conclusion: to recognise that all beings with interests – irrespective of the<br />

classifications we give them, or the physical make-up of their bodies – are<br />

entitled to the protections offered by the rights in the Bill of Rights.

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