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Does balancing adequately capture the nature of rights? 279<br />

The lack of clarity on the nature of the notion of possibility employed<br />

in Alexy’s theory is linked to a more general problem involved in conceiving<br />

of rights as requirements that must be realised to the greatest extent possible.<br />

I shall now proceed to consider a key implication of <strong>this</strong> claim: the<br />

requirement that the means adopted to limit a right must be the least<br />

restrictive of the right in comparison to other possible alternatives (the socalled<br />

‘necessity’ component of proportionality).<br />

2.1 The ‘necessity’ problem<br />

The principle of necessity requires ‘that of two broadly equally suitable<br />

means, the one which interferes less intensively [with a right] should be<br />

chosen’. 52 If rights are norms that must be optimised to the greatest extent<br />

possible, then when engaged in proportionality analysis, courts should adopt<br />

a stringent approach ensuring that any limitation of a right that is being<br />

proposed should strictly speaking be necessary to realise the purpose sought<br />

to be achieved. This means that no other alternative must be available that<br />

can equally realise the purpose and be less invasive of the right in question.<br />

Let us refer to <strong>this</strong> as the strong interpretation of necessity. According to the<br />

logical derivation of the principle of necessity given by Alexy, the strong<br />

interpretation is entailed by an understanding of rights as optimisation<br />

requirements. 53<br />

The question that arises is whether such a strong interpretation of<br />

necessity is desirable when conducting a proportionality enquiry. An example<br />

given by Alexy can help to illuminate <strong>this</strong> point. The Federal Constitutional<br />

Court in Germany was presented with a case in which they had to decide<br />

whether or not a government-imposed requirement that tobacco manufacturers<br />

had to place health warnings on cigarette packets was<br />

unconstitutional or not. 54 The tobacco manufacturers claimed that their right<br />

to trade freely had been unjustifiably infringed; the government argued that<br />

these health warnings were of importance in helping to deter smoking and to<br />

protect individuals against the severe health risks associated with it. Alexy<br />

analyses the case as follows: He contends that the government measure<br />

involves a relatively minor interference with the freedom of trade of tobacco<br />

manufacturers. On the other hand, the impact of smoking on human health<br />

is severe, leading to cancer and cardiovascular disease. Consequently, in the<br />

proportionality analysis, we have to compare a relatively minor interference<br />

with a right against a very strong case in favour of the limitation in question.<br />

Consequently, he concludes that the limitation on the rights of tobacco<br />

manufacturers, in such an instance, would be justified and the law in question<br />

would pass constitutional muster.<br />

52 Alexy (n 6 above) 398.<br />

53<br />

Alexy (n 6 above) 67 - 68, 399.<br />

54 BVerfGE 95, 173. Alexy (n 6 above) discusses the case at 402.

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