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84 Chapter 3<br />

‘core' or important than the right to freedom of religion is that it is false. 39<br />

The right to freedom of religion is ‘one of the most basic rights human<br />

beings possess. It would not be a huge exaggeration to suggest that <strong>this</strong><br />

freedom is the grain of sand in the oyster of politics around which the pearl<br />

of liberalism gradually formed.’ 40 Some would go further and claim that<br />

the right to freedom of religion takes precedence over the right to equality;<br />

that the right to religious liberty has ‘logical priority’ relative to other<br />

rights; 41 that it is ‘the ultimate freedom' and ‘not merely one of many<br />

rights, but the prototypical human right’. 42<br />

The correct position, however, is that expressed in the context of the<br />

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by Lamer CJ for the majority<br />

of the Canadian Supreme Court in Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp: 43<br />

A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be<br />

avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the<br />

common law. When the protected rights of two individuals come into conflict<br />

… Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the<br />

importance of both sets of rights.<br />

Accordingly, there cannot be a presumption in favour of the right to<br />

freedom of religion or the right to equality antecedent to the balancing of<br />

these rights. It is illegitimate to assert a presumption either way ‘without<br />

begging the question: which side carries the weight of argument in cases of<br />

conflict’ between the values of free association and religious liberty and<br />

non-discrimination. 44<br />

39 For one version of the claim that the right to equality is the most important<br />

constitutional value, see J Rutherford ‘Equality as the primary constitutional value: The<br />

case for applying employment discrimination laws to religion’ (1996) 81 Cornell Law<br />

Review 1049. As I Benson ‘The freedom of conscience and religion in Canada:<br />

Challenges and opportunities’ (2007) 21 Emory International Law Review 111 148 states,<br />

however, ‘[e]quality is not more important than freedom of religion’.<br />

40 W Galston The practice of liberal pluralism (2005) 178.<br />

41<br />

M McConnell ‘Religion and constitutional rights: Why religious liberty is the “first<br />

freedom”’ (2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1243 1244.<br />

42 K Hasson ‘Religious liberty and human dignity: A tale of two declarations’ (2003) 27<br />

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 81 88 89.<br />

43 [1994] 3 SCR 835 877.<br />

44 Gutmann (n 16 above) 11. A further argument may be open to those who seek to<br />

privilege equality over other rights. It may be claimed that the Equality Act itself<br />

privileges equality. On Woolman’s reading of the Equality Act, ‘[t]he Act makes<br />

equality per se an overridingly important goal’ and ‘a trump’ (Woolman (n 16 above)<br />

34). Although it does not ‘engage directly the complicated cluster of issues raised by<br />

conflicts between equality and association’, the Equality Act ‘poses an imminent threat<br />

to associational freedom’ (Woolman (n 16 above) 36), including, presumably, to<br />

religious associations. To the extent that the Equality Act gives equality precedence<br />

over associational freedom and religious liberty, <strong>this</strong> is illegitimate.

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