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238 Chapter 9
self-determination has had serious consequences for the Western discourse
on autonomy. As Berkowitz has accurately argued:
The problem that plagues all of these modern invocations of dignity from Dworkin
to Habermas is that they understand dignity as self-determination and then
stumble upon the contradiction in self-determination. Self-determination – the right
to personal autonomy that underlies human and civil rights – is frequently at
odds with self- determination – the democratic right of citizens to collectively
govern themselves. Indeed, the tension between individual and collective selfdetermination
is at the root of many of the great human rights tragedies of the
modern era. 24
For Arendt, this dilemma, which has haunted human rights discourse, cannot
easily be theoretically or practically overcome since it lies at the heart of
modern liberalism. And so she calls for a new political principle, a new law on
earth. 25
As we have seen, Kant himself did not identify autonomy with selfdetermination.
Yet there is little doubt that most of his modern interpreters have
done so. Can we still rely on Kant as the basis for dignity? Or do we need
another discourse? Even under the most sophisticated interpretation of Kant, our
dignity lies in our capacity for reason. For a thinker like Arendt that capacity has
carried little force against the horrors of the 20th century. Kant of course did not
base his idea of dignity in how we actually act but in how we should act, and it
is always a possibility for us that we might act rightly if we abided by the moral
law. But is that enough for a new law on earth?
8 Differences between Kantianism and ubuntu
There are several important differences that we need to emphasise
between Kantianism and ubuntu. First, as we have seen, dignity in ubuntu
thinking is not rooted in reason because of an ethical concern shared with
many feminists that this would deny dignity to too many human beings.
Thus, such a ground for dignity runs afoul of the virtues of inclusiveness
and acceptance. Instead, dignity is rooted first and foremost in our
singularity and uniqueness, and at the same time in our embeddedness as
part of a human community.
As we have also seen, the social bond is conceived differently, and
thus, although both traditions moralise law – and would find it equally
incomprehensible to separate law and morality in the Anglo-American
sense – they rely on different conceptions of moral personhood to do so.
Even the great Kantian hypothetical experiment in the imagination, in
24 R Berkowitz ‘Dignity jurisprudence: Building a new law on earth’ in D Cornell et al (eds)
The dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa: Cases and materials
(forthcoming 2011) 74 - 80.
25 H Arendt The origins of totalitarianism (1973) ix.