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Difference between ubuntu and dignity 239<br />

which we configure the conditions of the social contract rooted in the<br />

respect for all other human beings, still begins with imagined moral<br />

individuals. It is still individuals who agree to accept some form of<br />

coercion, even if rooted in Kant’s basic understanding of right, which is<br />

that individuals are allowed the greatest possible space for their freedom as<br />

long as it can be harmonised with the freedom of all others in the social<br />

contract. If freedom is inseparable from morality then at least as a<br />

possibility, we can represent ourselves as free human beings who can<br />

harmonise their interests in the Kingdom of Ends.<br />

Ubuntu, alternatively, does not conceive of the social bond through an<br />

imagined social contract undertaken by imagined moral individuals. We are<br />

born into a social bond but it is not as if the social is something outside the<br />

individual. It is the network of relationships in and through which we are<br />

formed and whose formation is ultimately our responsibility. There is a flow,<br />

back and forth, between the individual and others as he or she undertakes the<br />

struggle to become a person, always conceived ethically, which is difficult to<br />

think of in Western philosophy. It is certainly not impossible to think of such<br />

a back and forth, but it is difficult because the social is sedimented as<br />

something outside the individual. Of course, if we add Kant to Hegel and<br />

Marx, we begin to see possibilities for such a dialectic. Am I suggesting that<br />

ubuntu thinking and African humanism are better resources on which to<br />

ground the new law on earth, the new political principle to which Arendt<br />

calls us? I am certainly arguing that a reinvigorated defence of dignity,<br />

whether as the grundnorm of the South African Constitution or as a new<br />

universal political and ethical principle must bring <strong>this</strong> intellectual heritage<br />

into the debate as an equal partner. Such a dialogue is long overdue, and<br />

necessary for the continuing defence of human dignity in South Africa and the<br />

rest of the world.

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