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328 Chapter 14<br />

character, and not inconsistent with the Court’s judicial function, has<br />

consistently been raised by disputants. However, although article 65(1) of<br />

the ICJ Statute plainly allows plenty of room for deference towards other<br />

organs of the UN and other international actors and the discretion to<br />

refuse to assume jurisdiction, the ICJ has made it plain that although it has<br />

<strong>this</strong> discretion, the Court has never refused a request to provide an Advisory<br />

Opinion. 42<br />

The Court stresses that when a case includes political aspects as so<br />

often happens in the international arena, it does not serve to deprive the<br />

case of its character as raising a ‘legal question’ or to ‘deprive the Court of<br />

a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute’. 43 The ICJ has<br />

insisted that whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit<br />

the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially<br />

judicial task. 44 In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, the<br />

ICJ stated that its judicial function involves ascertaining the existence or<br />

otherwise of legal principles and applicable rules, and stating the law, even<br />

if, in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its<br />

scope and content and sometimes note its general trend. 45 Critical to note is<br />

the point that in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to<br />

specify its scope and content. It is thus submitted that if, for instance, an<br />

issue pertaining to the right of peoples to self-determination as provided<br />

for in article 55 of the UN Charter arose, within the exercise of its judicial<br />

function, the ICJ would have to define the content of that right in order to<br />

specify its scope.<br />

In spite of being urged not to exercise its Advisory Opinion jurisdiction –<br />

based on such arguments as legitimacy, separation of powers among the<br />

organs of the UN, institutional competence, polycentric issues, the fact that<br />

the General Assembly or the Security Council have the requisite<br />

competence – the ICJ has declined to abdicate its judicial task of<br />

determining the legal questions brought before it, or to clarify the scope of<br />

the law, its general trend, or to spell out the legal consequences of the<br />

conduct of subjects of international law. Indeed, the ICJ has emphasised that<br />

as a principal organ of the UN, its decisions in such cases should not be seen<br />

as a usurpation of the roles of other principal organs of the UN, but rather<br />

as representing its participation in the activities of the UN. Hence, requests<br />

to render such decisions should not be refused. 46 Thus, notwithstanding<br />

the very permissive words of article 65(1) of the ICJ statute for the Court<br />

42 Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian<br />

territory, Advisory Opinion (2004) ICJ Reports 136 156.<br />

43 ‘Application for review of Judgment no 158 of the United Nations Administrative<br />

Tribunal’ Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports (1973) 172 para 14.<br />

44<br />

(1950) ICJ Reports 6 - 7; ‘Certain expenses of the United Nations (art 17 para 2 of the<br />

Charter)’ Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1962) 155.<br />

45 (1996) ICJ Reports 226, 237 para 18.<br />

46<br />

‘Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania’ First Phase,<br />

Advisory Opinion, (1950) ICJ Reports 71.

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