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On the basis of questioning Socrates' best possible moral conduct,
and not the overall lack of such behaviour, Vlastos raises
questions concerning both parts of his accusation. For the first part:
“Was Socrates present in the Assembly that day the disastrous vote
was taken?". He expresses his point of view: “We do not know. But
we can infer securely that if present he kept his mouth shut. For
when he reviews his political past at his trial fourteen years later he
pleads guilty to the reproach that throughout his life he ‘had not
mounted the rostrum to advise the state'. The reason he gives us is
surprising: ‘You know that if I had tried to do politics [prattein ta
politika] long ago I would have perished long ago and done no
good to you or to myself' ". In any case, “considering how desperate
was his city's need for sober advice, would it not have been his
duty to do whatever he could, little or much, to make the voice of
reason heard, regardless of consequences to himself?". 5 Regarding
the second part of the accusation Vlastos raises the following question:
“Is there any way of understanding how a rational man of
exemplar rectitude could have failed to speak in exercise of his civic
rights when acts of that ilk [what was about to happen in
Mytilene, which was also about to take place against Torone, Scione
and Melos] by the city he loved so much hung in the balance?". 6
The answer to this question could very easily be the same as for the
first part: ‘You know that if I had tried to do politics [prattein ta
politika] long ago I would have perished long ago and done no
good to you or to myself' ".
In fact, Vlastos seems to accept the aforementioned Socratic
reply to some extent. The Greek philosopher of the Diaspora maintains
that “we may get a glimmering of insight into it [this last
question he raised concerning the second part of the accusation] if
we recall that all of Socrates' energies are committed single-mindedly
to that one thing he felt his god commanded him to do: ‘to live
philosophizing, examining himself and others' ". 7 The Socratic devotion
to the one-to-one elenctic argument parallels his words in the
Apology that if he had tried to do politics, he would have done no
good to the citizens, especially one by one, or to himself. This is
how he understands and practises the divine command “philosophizing",
and not by addressing a multitude. Yet, Vlastos wants, desi-
that a good man will help friends and harm enemies, Socrates claims that genuine
virtue will never lead one to injure others.".
5 See G. Vlastos, ibid., p. 129 and regarding the two passages see Plato,
Apology, 31c and 31d correspondingly.
6 G. Vlastos, ibid., p. 130.
7 Ibid., pp. 130—131. For Socrates' words see Apology, 28e.
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