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tes at the heart of Socrates' ethics the conviction that the most important
human goods are the virtues, and hence a life of virtue is
the highest form of human living". 26 A “virtue could be merely a
know-how related to certain activities". 27
If the historical Socrates is so much devoted to practising moral
inquiry, to the knowing-how-to-be-moral issue, to such “words and
deeds", 28 performed by a “metaphysically innocent, elenctic moralist"
who was depicted “in the early dialogues", 29 there is little
expectation for his doing politics. This elucidates his moral blank,
his moral imperfection. As a historical figure, he could nonetheless
have participated in the Athenian Assembly. Since “public affairs
are not governed by knowledge" and since “Athenian statesmen and
those who elect them are ignorant even though they sometimes
might get lucky and rule by true opinion", 30 the Socratic voice of
reason could, and should as Vlastos would demand from Socrates,
be raised. Not only could this historical figure have done politics,
but it was necessary to do so.
It has to be emphasized that “Vlastos' Socrates is not perfection:
he ought, for instance, to have protested more than he did
against injustices perpetrated by Athens". 31 This imperfection is the
precise equivalent of the Socratic moral blank. It has also to be
stressed that what the historical figure practises is moral inquiry.
The ancient Athenian philosopher never inquires into the theory of
moral inquiry. He neither gives answers. He just forms soul-saving
questions. In the Assembly, what would be needed are resolutions,
which means answers. Still, if there was space for moral inquiry in
the Assembly, it could not be performed massively. The moral
inquiry is a personal, face-to-face procedure. The “by yourself for
yourself" Socratic approach refers to individual direction to (moral)
truth, not to general masses or multitude. This same direction appears
in the thesis that the Socratic “irony is a way of getting us to
26 J. M. Moravcsik, ibid., p. 208.
27 Ibid.
28 W. Mathie, “Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher by Gregory Vlastos",
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 25,
1 (1992), p. 197.
29 C. C. W. Taylor, “Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher by Gregory
Vlastos", The Philosophical Quarterly, 42, 167 (1992), p. 229.
30 See J. Gordon, “Against Vlastos on Complex Irony", The Classical Quarterly,
46, 1 (1996), p. 131. These theses are from Meno, 96d—99d. Although this
dialogue belongs to Plato's middle period and not to his earlier works (with the historical
Socrates), it describes a general situation regarding public affairs in Athens.
31 N. White, ibid., p. 238. Cf. G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher,
Cornell University Press, 1991.
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