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nature of interim or transitional governments cannot explain their foreign policydecisions independently. Perceptions of the international community, especiallyrelated to the legitimacy of outgoing previous regimes, may provide incentives toincoming administrations for foreign policy change, for example. 199A fourth advantage is the theory’s cognisance of the agency of individual leaders inthe middle power activism of large developing countries. Unlike the middle poweractivism of the ‘traditional’ middle powers of the global North, which largelyderived from state-society pressures on foreign policy, 200 mediated though politicalparties and religious organisations, individual leaders, as seen in Chapter 2, havebeen prominent in forging internationalist foreign policies in the developing world.Yet, the neoclassical realist approach does not fall prey to the ‘charismatic leader’approach to foreign policymaking in developing countries, criticised by Third Worldscholars for psychological reductionism, and bearing a disproportionate amount ofthe explanatory burden in older theories of FPA in the developing world. 201 In thisway, too, middle powers are not submerged as they are by neorealism’s ‘greatpower’ bias. The additional variables of perception, and relative power highlight thepotential significance, on any given international question, of even the smallest state.It might be argued that there is some potential for tension in using a realist theoryto account for ‘internationalist’ or liberal postures in international politics. In fact,there is none. The basis of such criticism would be that it would be highly unlikelyfor ideas to trump interests in determining courses of action in foreign policy. Thus,any ideas - or ideals – proffered as the basis for international action would merelybe masking rational state behaviour typical of the realist paradigm. The reality is thatinternational action based upon, or cloaked in the language of, ideals may be in astate’s best interests as it seeks to build diverse coalitions in internationalnegotiations, and render its external environment more predictable. For example,199 Paulo Gorjão, Paulo, “Regime Change and Foreign Policy: Portugal, Indonesia, andthe Self-determination of East Timor”, Democratization, 9, No.4 (Winter 2002).200 Notable leaders acted as guides for Northern internationalism, too. These includeLester Pearson of Canada and Olaf Palme of Sweden. Yet, domestic society in bothCanada and Sweden was overwhelmingly in favour of the internationalist foreign policiespromoted by these leaders. (See Black, 1992). This is the case to a far lesser extent inthe global South, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6.201 Korany, “Review”, 469. For a more detailed discussion of psychological issues in theFPA of developing societies, see Bahgat Korany, Social Change, Charisma andInternational Behaviour (Leiden: Sijthoff,1976): 86-90, cited in the 1983 article.100