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engaging in ‘megaphone’ diplomacy. This in itself, Mugabe’s continuing disastrousrule notwithstanding, may be considered a measure of success in an otherwisecheerless effort, considering that any more strident measures might have hadaltogether more disastrous consequences. 397 ANC also maintains links withnumerous other former liberation movements in Africa and abroad, that potentiallyinfluence the direction of South African foreign policy. Examples of this include itslinks with MPLA (Angola), FRELIMO (Mozambique), SWAPO (Namibia) andeven the SPLM in Sudan. The Party’s historical links with ZANU-PF’s liberationerarival, ZAPU, have been partially blamed for Mbeki’s failure to win the respectand cooperation of Mugabe during his facilitation of a resolution to the Zimbabwecrisis.b. Personal and presidential diplomacyNelson Mandela’s renown as a statesman of global acclaim lent itself to personaldiplomacy to such an extent that he was able single-handedly to spearhead DFA’smediation in the extradition of the Lockerbie bombers from Libya for trial atScottish courts in The Hague. 398 The institutional obstacles encountered by theDepartment of Foreign Affairs during the transition to democracy and afterward,lent Mandela the ability to act independently in implementing South Africa’s foreignpolicy. While for his part, Mbeki attempted to rely more on multilateralism, thecentralisation of foreign policy formulation in the presidential office afforded SouthAfrica’s second democratically-elected president a central role in this process.According to one observation, “The presidency, the primary locus of policy, hasbeen entrenched through formal institutionalisation and a marginalisation of partyinterests, so that it now sets not only foreign-policy goals, but is the sole architect ofan overarching foreign-policy vision”. 399 This is not to be confused with the role ofthe party, as it is widely noted that Mbeki effected a gradual distance betweenhimself and the party in the making of public policy. This distance becameincreasingly apparent in the disjuncture between the ANC and Mbeki on importantforeign policy issues, such as Zimbabwe, for example.397 For the debate on the merits of South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach, see JamesHammill and John Hoffman, “‘Quiet Diplomacy’ or Appeasement? South African Policytowards Zimbabwe”, The Round Table, 98, Issue 402 (2009).398 See Lyn Boyd-Judson, “Strategic Moral Diplomacy: Mandela, Qaddafi, and theLockerbie Negotiations”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1, Issue 1 (2005).399 Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, 72.169