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falls short of capturing the full gamut of motivations of the behaviour of thesestates. While the exclusive focus on multilateralism as a ‘force multiplier’ in theforeign policies of emerging states is a compelling liberal account of their conduct,the limits of the diffusion of liberal values become apparent when intermediatestates use international organisations to prevent actions or resolutions that may beprejudicial to their allies or trading partners. An example of the latter is the failure ofboth South Africa and Brazil to censure Cuba in the UN’s Human Rights Council.8.3. Future directions: South AfricaIn utilising the relationship between resources and the ends to which they are put asan analytical framework, it appears that South Africa is severely constrained by itsdomestic capacity problems. It is not sufficient that the ruling party, the AfricanNational Congress, dominates the state. Ultimately the fruition of its foreign policyplans depends heavily on the material resources (national power) and theirconversion into state power. Thus, South Africa appears to be set for a prolongedperiod of internationalism based on rhetoric, notwithstanding – or even underlinedby - its recent inclusion with other emerging economies within the BRICgrouping. 711The departure of a significant source of ideational power for South African foreignpolicy, former President Thabo Mbeki, will also act as a restraint on adventurism.By the same token, it may potentially have provided the opportunity for adecentralisation of foreign policy, though this development is not to be taken forgranted. There is also the question of whom policy has been decentralised to: thestate bureaucracy, the party elite, or faceless presidential advisers? There is anincreasing trend toward uniformity of political conviction (or the pretense of such)in the current administration of President Jacob Zuma, while a clear and coherentforeign policy outlook is struggling to emerge. The parliamentary opposition isbecoming increasingly meticulous in its oversight of foreign policy decisions, butthis still does not appear to be a significant source of policy opposition for the ANCgovernment. While the highly controversial and costly – not only in economic terms711 South Africa’s GDP at the end of 2009, a year before being invited to join BRIC, was$285.3bn, while Brazil’s stood at $1.57tn, Russia’s at $1.23tn, India’s at $1.31tn, andChina’s at $4.99tn. Source: World Bank Data.292