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welfare measures. The party’s relationship with its constituency was changingrapidly in face of the needs of electoral democracy: PT crafted a move away fromthe left and toward the centre on economic policy. The increasing interest ofimportant trade sectors in foreign policy meant that the government, in order toappeal to the right, had to make important concessions to the business sector.Hence, PT enjoyed less institutional freedom in deploying the state’s resources forforeign policy commitments. It held strong legitimating power to justify Braziliancommitments abroad, however, in the context of the Brazilian elite’s longstandingdesire to win a more influential place for the country in international affairs.Under the Lula administration, balancing the requirements of internationalrecognition and domestic alliance-building, while remaining true to at least someaspects of PT’s traditional posture, has led to a foreign policy that maintains thebasic traditional principles of Brazilian foreign policy, yet leaves room for thefreedom of action of the executive in determining the emphases of the foreignpolicy of a PT-led Brazil.In the case of South Africa’s foreign policymaking, the absence of a stronginstitutional counterweight in the executive (viz., a powerful foreign ministry) doesnot preclude the existence of basic foreign policy principles. However, bycentralising the policymaking machinery, as well as narrowing the political base ofinfluence, Thabo Mbeki was able to ignore critics of his foreign policy, from bothleft and right. The party’s influence was ultimately negligible compared with that ofMbeki’s ideas and subjectivities. Compared to Lula’s position, Mbeki enjoyed fewinstitutional constraints. South Africa’s parliamentary system inherited with thepolitical transition gave way to centralising moves by Mbeki in order to shore up thePresidency. This was not as simple in the Brazilian context, although key foreignpolicymaking functions did move to the Planalto Palace, and were embodied in keyindividuals appointed to strategic posts.The following two chapters, examining South Africa and Brazil, respectively, detailthe limits and constraints on the projection of state power by these twointermediate states.140