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– arms purchase of 1999 appeared to equip South Africa for ‘primary’ missions, thepolitical leadership is still hesitant to throw South Africa’s military weight around.This was in evidence recently with Jacob Zuma’s reticence to support a campaign ofmilitary intervention in Ivory Coast, and even failing to choose a side, following thedisputed November 2010 run-off election in that country. 712 Although a closestruggle-era relationship between the ANC and Laurent Gbagbo was cited asanother reason for this.South Africa’s transformative agenda is also held hostage to misplaced ideas ofSouthern solidarity and anti-Western imperialism. Although these notions are firmlyderived from the ANC’s own struggle history, 713 they will require some re-working,which has not yet properly taken place, in the foreign policy of a sovereign stateseeking a leadership role in African continental and global politics. The agendaappears to be held captive by a near-paranoia about being seen to act as a hegemonor as a power acting in its own interests. This is a reflection of South Africa’s recalibratedperception of its own power in Africa after the Nigeria debacle, and thefailure of its Zimbabwe policy. The country withheld any comment against HosniMubarak, in spite of attacks by the Egyptian state against peaceful protesters in thatcountry’s January 2011 change of government, calling only for “the Governmentand people of Egypt to seek a speedy and peaceful resolution to the currentcrisis”, 714 thereby hedging its bets. On Libya, South Africa displayed disastrousincoherence in foreign policy formulation, more a function of domestic disarraythan any other factor. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, thecountry voted in favour of Resolution 1973 authorising a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya –acting against all of its own foreign policy principles and past practice. In apparentlyattempting to make amends, South Africa has refused to recognise Libya’s interimleadership, the Transitional National Council, and to unfreeze Libyan assets for theCouncil’s use. More significantly, South Africa failed to provide leadership, of either712 Bloomberg, “South Africa Bully Phobia Yields No Stance on Ivory Coast PoliticalChaos”, 9 March, 2011. Accessed online at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-08/south-africa-bully-phobia-yields-no-stance-on-ivory-coast-chaos.html on 14 March,2011.713 As shown in the current work, and additionally, in the work of Laurie Nathan, anexpert on South Africa’s defence and foreign policies. See Nathan, “Interests, Ideas andIdeology, 19.714 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, “Media Statement on thesituation in Egypt”, 31 January, 2011. Accessed at:http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2011/media0131.html on 14 March, 2011.293