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Aristide’s birthday, our people will be ignorant of all …that is happening inHaiti”. 642This ignorance was not helped by the lack of government transparency on thematter. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was famously tight-lipped about the extentof the expenses Aristide’s sojourn in South Africa was costing the state 643 and therationale for the state’s offer of asylum. The Democratic Alliance supplemented itsenquiries in Parliament with a letter to the chairman of the National ConventionalArms Control Committee (NCACC), Professor Kader Asmal, asking whether apermit had been granted for the export of the arms and equipment to Haiti. 644 Afurther complicating factor was whether personnel had been dispatched in respectof the equipment, in which case this would constitute a deployment of SouthAfrican troops abroad, an action that requires Parliamentary oversight.On 13 May 2004, the ANC commended the decision of the Cabinet to accede toCARICOM’s request for Aristide’s asylum in South Africa. It noted that, “Thedecision was a reasonable and responsible response to a request from a regionalmultilateral body that has long been seized with the resolution of the crisis in Haiti”,and that “South Africa has a responsibility to assist in whatever way it can toachieve a peaceful and lawful resolution of Haiti’s current crisis”. 6457.3.4. International implications: A case of neoclassical realist restraint?The primary international consequence of Aristide’s asylum in South Africa was hisphysical removal from the Caribbean, where his presence was viewed by the US and642 Thabo Mbeki, “State of the Nation Address”, Parliamentary Hansard, 6 February2004.643 See Chapter 5 and Parliament of South Africa. 2008. “Question No. 528: Published inInternal Question Paper No. 10 of 20 March 2008”, electronic Hansard of theParliamentary Monitoring Group. Accessed online at:http://www.pmg.org.za/node/14848 on 22 November, 2010.644 Haiti Info. 2004. “DA sends letter to Asmal over SA arms to Haiti”, 5 March 2004.645 African National Congress. 2004. “Press Statement: Cabinet’s decision on Aristide”,13 May, 2004. Accessed online at:http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/pr/2004/pr0513a.html on 8 December,2010.252
his enemies in Haiti as potentially incendiary. 646 Immediately after being deposed inHaiti, Aristide was relocated to the Central African Republic (CAR). He wassubsequently exiled, upon his own request, to Jamaica. From Jamaica, he receivedan offer of asylum from the South African government, acting on the request ofCARICOM.The asylum of Aristide and his family in South Africa was seen as one consequenceof President Mbeki’s commitment to the idea of an African diaspora, 647important new component in African continental initiatives, one on which manyresources are expended, and where the Caribbean is a particular focus. Just prior tothe onset of the crisis, Mbeki extended an invitation to AU leaders to join Haiti’sbicentenary celebrations in January 2004. The Caribbean was seen as an importantarena of extending the links between the African continent and Africans abroad.Indeed, it was the region of the world on which the AU’s focus first turned for itsobjective of strengthening relations and solidarity with the people of the AfricanDiaspora. As Mbeki stated,The celebration of the bicentenary of the Haitian Revolution and the Decade ofLiberation in South Africa during the same year, 2004, must serve to inspire allAfricans to act together and decisively to end their poverty, underdevelopment,dehumanisation and marginalisation. 648anYet, South Africa resisted the temptation to become more actively involved in theHaiti crisis.646 A US government cable of 22 November 2004 later leaked by Wikileaks revealed thatBrazil, in the guise of Marco Aurélio Garcia also felt that “Aristide must not be allowedback into Haitian politics under any circumstances”. See Folha.com, 2011. “MarcoAurélio Garcia não quer Aristide volte á política haitiana”, 14 January, 2011. Accessedonline at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/859680-marco-aurelio-garcia-nao-querque-aristide-volte-a-politica-haitiana-leia-em-ingles.shtmlon 6 June, 2011.647 This view is shared by Landsberg. See Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy ofLiberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition. (Cape Town: JacanaPress, 2004): 178.648 Cited in Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation, 179.253
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To my parents, Christopher and Vali
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSNothing that preced
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LIST OF SIGNIFICANT ACRONYMS AND AB
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PTRDPSACPSADCSPLMSWAPOUNCTADUNMIHUN
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Chapter 7 The New Internationalists
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Chapter 1: Introduction1.1. Context
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overwhelmingly, yet not completely,
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Hence, shifts in the international
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antipathy of the IR literature to a
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frowned upon by developed and devel
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identify cases - and these were num
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politics and political lobbying. Th
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This is followed by the presentatio
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emerging powers Brazil, Russia, Ind
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decades. More a collection of works
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exercised more frequently, where th
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The role of left-leaning political
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outcomes? Which instruments have th
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percent. 56 In South Africa, Blacks
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Brazil, because in engaging in this
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which domestic institutional arrang
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Chapter 2: Internationalism in the
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potentially providing indications o
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and most important, that these two
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According to Goldmann, internationa
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granted that states will always hav
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transformation in the anarchical in
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2.2.3 Post-Cold WarThe immediate af
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emains a rallying cry in contempora
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their stress on peaceful settlement
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epresentation; and peaceful mechani
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experienced international marginali
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colonial state. 136 The commitment
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dominant nations which may hope to
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domestic welfare arrangements and f
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foreign policy. The latter include
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adjust to shifts in their internati
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to seemingly altruistic or ‘ethic
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ethics may underpin the same foreig
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As noted by Taliaferro, however, ne
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Systemic Constraints :AnarchyRelati
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Neorealism’s emphasis on the syst
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the executive (i.e. Lead ministries
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individuals - located at the “int
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argument, and rational cost-benefit
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nature of interim or transitional g
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The neoclassical realist framework
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104
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practicable and analytically releva
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(CUT), the main trade union confede
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These incipient foreign policy prin
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each province, consisting of 10 del
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While this figure is small in globa
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mercantilist’, 238 or ‘revoluti
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The party’s commitment to the pro
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2. Strengthening of South-South Co-
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Some of South Africa’s accomplish
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slavery. Even Brazil’s participat
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that was seen to be experiencing a
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The Presidency makes foreign policy
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and socialisation practices, as wel
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members were negotiated. 296 Recent
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President Lula’s second and last
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4.2.3. International OutlookBrazil
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linguistic distinction from its Spa
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welfare measures. The party’s rel
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142
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missions and disaster relief. Yet,
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international orientation. Most of
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electoral system. The following sec
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identity changed as the challenges
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to the United States, with the atte
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eforms undertaken in the mid-1980s.
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ecognised as the ‘sole legitimate
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whole world. ANC solidarity was not
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1994, 370 placing tangible limits o
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The organisation’s main shortcomi
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Much of Mandela’s tenure as Presi
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with more wealthy donors in the Glo
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complicates the task of separating
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Thabo Mbeki was frequently lampoone
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the social-democratic Reconstructio
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At the helm of DFA were two individ
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policy. One, which is less signific
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Globally, the United States and its
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South Africa under Mbeki had decide
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his support for Mugabe against the
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on Participation in International P
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(FOCAC) Conference in November. The
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Mbeki’s last full year in office,
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190
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international norms and regimes. 45
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of Brazil. In this discussion, Braz
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This period came to an end during t
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This dilemma - the choice between c
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on so-called ‘cultural diplomacy
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Page 210 and 211: een required of PT as a party of th
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Page 218 and 219: election campaign, a rarity for a f
Page 220 and 221: alumni, have been the subject of mu
Page 222 and 223: 6.5. Criticism from other political
Page 224 and 225: - the 2001 attacks on the United St
Page 226 and 227: Middle East, but they also appeared
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Page 230 and 231: São Tomé and Principe, Ethiopia a
Page 232 and 233: emphasised the principle of non-int
Page 234 and 235: US$180 bn, compared to US$85 bn the
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Page 238 and 239: country enjoyed, and by the apparen
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Page 242 and 243: from their repeatedly-stated commit
Page 244 and 245: On this occasion the force was able
Page 246 and 247: Instead, France and the US were mor
Page 248 and 249: and groups in their efforts to prom
Page 250 and 251: to the leader of the Parliamentary
Page 254 and 255: 7.4. Brazil’s strategy on Haiti:
Page 256 and 257: taken by two branches of the armed
Page 258 and 259: esolutions). 664 A primary example
Page 260 and 261: However, Haiti was not merely a hum
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Page 264 and 265: giving near-automatic assent to the
Page 266 and 267: • Universalism, and• Internatio
Page 268 and 269: A prominent official discourse on t
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Page 272 and 273: Part III: Thematic Discussion and C
Page 274 and 275: Chapter 8: Neoclassical Realism, In
Page 276 and 277: policymaking elites of these states
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Page 290 and 291: at the unit-level, where the state
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Page 296 and 297: It is also plausible to expect that
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Appendix 1: Brazilian Presidents si
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1910: Formation of the Union of Sou
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2004: ANC wins landslide election v
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1960: Jânio Quadro is elected pres
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Renan Calheiros, speaker of the Sen
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31 May 2004: Jean-Bertrand Aristide
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SeptemberOctoberNovemberDecemberMap
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OctoberNovemberDecember11: South Af
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JuneJuly23: South Africa participat
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OctoberNovemberreadiness for South
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FebruaryMarchSouth Africa establish
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June 2006, legislative andmunicipal
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FebruaryKuwaiti deputy premier visi
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Appendix 6: Selected Brazilian Inte
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agreement proposed by theUSA to gra
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in Iran.2004JanuaryLula visits Indi
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Brazil is successful in its cottond
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Brazil opens Consulates-General in
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and MINUSTAH authorities.OctoberNov
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Maythe installation ofEMPBRAPA’s
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Honduras and Nicaragua withthe Inte
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NovemberLula requests Minister Amor
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AprilMayJuneJulyand the Palestinian
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REFERENCESList of InterviewsBrazilL
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______, Sally Morphet and Marco Ant
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______. 2004. “Aristide arrives i
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______, Jacqueline Anne. 2003. “C
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Connors, Michael E. Connors. 2005.
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contributors). 1986. How Foreign Po
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Glenn, John. 2009. “Realism versu
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Hirst, Monica. 2009. “South Ameri
Page 364 and 365:
Jönsson, Christer. 2002. “Chapte
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Lipton, Merle. 2009. “Understandi
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______. 2004. “State of the Natio
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International Studies Convention, L
Page 372 and 373:
Pfister, Roger. 2003. “Gateway to
Page 374 and 375:
Samuels, David. 2004. “From Socia
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______. 2003. “Culture(s) of the
Page 378 and 379:
UOL Notícias. 2009. “Celso Amori
Page 380:
World Bank. 2009. Gross Domestic Pr
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