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so this was an issue area that was doubly distant from the South African politicalscene, and by extrapolation, the ANC’s election prospects and the health of itsalliance with COSATU and the SACP.The engagement in Haiti served PT’s interests, in spite of the fact that the party wascaught unawares by the Brazilian government’s decision to deploy, and in somequarters was highly critical of it. It helped to cement the left-of-centre profile ofPresident Lula, by the presentation of Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH as an actof solidarity with a fellow developing state. With the change in Brazil’s foreignpolicy outlook that attended the ascension of PT to power, pursuit of thecredentials for UNSC permanent membership became more urgent under CelsoAmorim. However, the decision to deploy was not a decision that could beapproved by the executive alone; it required the approval of Congress. Surprisingly,given Brazil’s history of commitment to non-interference, and the nature ofAristide’s departure, this was obtained by a large majority, but was nonetheless a‘torturous’ 696 process. Brazil’s conduct at the head of the mission has come underextensive criticism, both domestically and abroad. This has been noted as a factorthat limited Brazilian troops in their actions to pacify notoriously dangeroussections of Port-au-Prince – a factor that was ultimately overcome, with direconsequences in July 2005 and again in December 2006, in the Cité Soleil area ofthe capital. 697Ultimately, internationalism in each case trod very different paths, in spite of SouthAfrica and Brazil’s relatively equal diplomatic and political distance from the Haiticrisis. On the part of South Africa, decisions to engage in the Haiti issue, whetherby the reported attempted dispatch of arms to assist Aristide, or by the granting ofasylum, or “visitor status” to the former President and his family, were taken abovethe political fray. The only opposition to the decisions came from oppositionparliament members and the issue barely entered the public realm of debate. In theBrazilian case, it had to struggle against the domestic obstacles to itsimplementation, and could not rise above domestic politics, given the media interest696 Refugees International, “Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH must intervene to stopviolence”, Relief Web. 17 March 2005. Accessed online at:http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/RMOI-6AL42T?OpenDocument on 8March, 2011.697 Ibid.270