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ensure their own survival, 43 regardless of how imminent a threat appears. This is anunlikely answer to the question posed of the two case studies, as they each occupyrelatively peaceful environments. Brazil has not seen inter-state war within itsimmediate region since the 1867 wars with Paraguay and Argentina, and SouthAfrica has occupied a less volatile region since the change of government in 1994.Power accumulation for its own sake is not how South Africa and Brazil haveelected to project their influence, and each state has been remarkably reticent in itsprojection of power regionally.Realism also bequeaths the concept of polarity – or how the number of greatpowers in the system affects relations between states - to the analysis of risingpowers. Comparative capabilities and how powers rise are determined by theirmaterial resources, and, according to classical realists, by the social bases of nationalpower. States have access only to expendable state power. 44 Balancing is dependentboth on the external agglomeration of power through alliances, and the internalbuild-up of capabilities through economic growth and national development, not tomention the development of indigenous arms industries, and the less tangible socialbase of national power.Related to this interpretation is that power is an end in itself, the view of ClassicalRealism. States seek power in order simply to become more powerful, moreinfluential and less susceptible to the predations of greater powers. Small powersseek power to become intermediate powers; and, intermediate powers pursue powerto become great powers. The concepts of prestige, honour and recognition, areimplicated in this answer to the question posed above. This is highly plausible in ananalysis of South Africa and Brazil because it accounts for the reliance on repetitivetropes of ‘belonging’ and ‘rightful place’ evident in the speeches and publicutterances of the national leaders of South Africa and Brazil. Yet, it does notaccount for their arguably muted paths to power. Furthermore, the realist oppositesof balancing and bandwagoning also do not go far enough in accounting for thebehaviour of emerging powers: they are too narrow. In formations such as BRIC,43 John Mearsheimer, “Chapter 4: Structural Realism”, in International RelationsTheories: Discipline and Diversity, eds., Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 71-88: 72.44 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. This concept is elucidated further in Chapter 3.33